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ABSTRACT 
A significant challenge to reducing pervasive security risks in judiciary operations 
is the lack of an objective method to evaluate and compare existing levels of risk in court 
facilities.  This is particularly problematic when security-funding enhancements are not 
supported by a standardized risk assessment methodology.  
This thesis proposes a risk-based approach to identify and reduce risk to court 
security operations.  The primary thrust of this research effort is the development and 
testing of a risk assessment tool.  Threat, vulnerability, and consequence elements of the 
risk assessment tool are identified and quantified.  The tool is beta-tested using data from 
four California courts.  The end result is a risk assessment tool which can serve as an 
integral part of a decision support system to help court security managers identify and 
reduce pervasive security risks. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
Courthouses must be a safe harbor to which members of the public come 
to resolve disputes that often are volatile. Once courthouses themselves 
are perceived as dangerous, the integrity and efficacy of the entire judicial 
process is in jeopardy. 
   — Ronald M. George, Chief Justice of California 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Judiciaries are, by their very nature, fraught with a common conundrum: how to 
balance the goal of “access to justice for all” with the need to maintain a secure physical 
environment for judicial officers, court staff, and public stakeholders.   
The third branch of government, embodied in the federal, state, and local/tribal 
courts throughout the nation, is vital to the democratic ideals upon which America is 
based.  Therefore, it is essential that accessibility to courts is maintained for all those 
seeking entry.  At the same time as accessibility to justice must be maintained, courts are 
under regular threat from those attempting to do harm to the system, its judicial officers 
or court staff, or court facilities themselves.   
The balance is between ensuring access to justice and maintaining a secure 
environment where all stakeholders (members of the public, in-custody defendants, 
judges, court staff, etc.) are safe to conduct the business of the third branch of 
government.  In order to do so, the court must be committed to a robust physical security 
system.    
The quality of court security varies widely throughout the California state courts.  
While the majority of courts in California, for example, have entrance screening stations 
in order to lessen the likelihood of weapons and other contraband in the court, a 2006 
survey revealed that 22 percent of the courts in the state did not possess entrance 
screening.  Some state courts have well-defined secure circulation zones allowing judicial 
officers and court staff to circulate separately from “in-custody” inmates.  Many courts, 
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however, have no such separation.  In these courts, judicial officers and the inmates they 
see in court regularly come into close contact.  In many courts, the mixing of inmates, 
judicial officers, jurors, and members of the public exacerbates the situation.  These are 
just two examples of many of the wide variances in court security levels throughout the 
California state court system.   
The drastic differences in court security throughout the state are the result of 
multiple factors.  Probably the most significant determinant is the fact that, until 2002, 
court facilities were under individual county control.  Counties built new courts, 
converted existing facilities into court space, and installed security equipment according 
to county standards.  With fifty-eight counties in the state, fifty-eight vastly different 
standards for security were employed throughout the judiciary.  Some counties were 
diligent, for instance, about building foyers with adequate space to accommodate 
entrance screening.  Others were not.  A few counties considered the need for ballistic 
resistant material in judges’ benches.  Most did not.   
Another barrier to court security lies in the large numbers of registered historic 
buildings that house courts throughout California.  Many courts are located in facilities 
that date to the nineteenth century.  Several of today’s security concerns (small but 
powerful bombs, easily concealable high powered weapons, etc.) did not exist when these 
buildings were initially constructed.  Additionally, security, as a science, was not as 
refined as in modern times.  Today, it is taken for granted that there should be four 
completely separate circulation zones in court facilities (one for inmates, one for judicial 
officers and staff, one for members of the public, and one in which all can interface).1  
This principle of court security was not foundational in the construction of new 
courthouses in the 1800s.   
Addressing a court’s security vulnerabilities and maintaining a secure court 
environment is extremely costly.  At the same time, court security improvement funding 
is a finite resource.  The current method used to allocate court security improvement 
funds in the state of California is based upon established need, on a court-by-court basis.  
                                                 
1 Michael Griebel and Todd Phillips, “Architectural Design for Security in Courthouse Facilities,” 
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, no. 576 (July 2001), 122-123. 
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The following generally defines the process by which security improvement funding is 
allocated to a court in the state of California.   
1) Court has identified a specific security deficiency to the Emergency Response and 
Security (ERS) unit within the Administrative Office of the Courts (AOC).2 
2) ERS has evaluated the court’s security, through conduct of a site visit and court 
security survey. 
3) Based upon subjective affirmation of the existing deficiency/vulnerability, ERS 
has allocated funding to the court for security upgrade project(s).  
While this process serves the purpose of mitigating security deficiencies in certain 
courts, it is not replicable across the range of court operations in the state for two primary 
reasons.  First, it is based largely on a first come, first served basis.  Security problems in 
one court are viewed in relation to the needs of that court only and not with an eye 
towards best enhancing security for courts statewide.  There is no holistic approach to the 
current process.  Additionally, it is extremely labor intensive.  This is a particular 
problem as there are over 450 facilities in the California Judicial Branch, and ERS staffs 
only one individual with the primary job responsibility to conduct court security 
surveys.3  In addition to the manpower issues this process presents, the method is rather 
subjective, and resulting funding allocations are open to criticism that no objective set of 
written standards are followed in the funding allocation process.   
The above approach suffers from a lack of a formalized, objective process for 
assessing and prioritizing risk to the courts.  Security deficiencies are prioritized based 
upon the experience of the ERS staff assessing the problem.  For example, the court in 
Lake County may approach ERS with a particular security deficiency: the judges’ bench 
in a courtroom in their facility, which lacks weapons screening, does not contain ballistic 
resistant material.  The court in Inyo County may approach ERS with a different 
problem: The clerk’s counters are not outfitted with any barrier between the clerks and 
the public.4  Were security improvement funds severely restricted, a decision may well 
                                                 
2 The Administrative Office of the Courts is the administrative arm for the California Judicial Branch. 
3 Two management-level individuals are also able to conduct surveys but are rarely available to do so.   
4 Both examples are theoretical and not actual.   
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need to be made as to which security upgrade to fund.  At this point, the decision would 
be purely subjective.  However, assume it were known that the judicial officer who sits 
behind that particular bench had been previously attacked by a paroled inmate who has 
threatened to shoot him?  In that case, the emergent need would clearly be to quickly 
install ballistic resistant material behind the bench.  What if, however, in the past five 
years, the clerks at the unprotected counter in Inyo County had seen weapons pulled on 
them twice?  At this point, which security upgrade is in most immediate need of funding?  
Without a formal risk-based process of assessing level of threat, vulnerability, and the 
consequences, the answers to the scenario remain subjective.  
This lack of a risk-based approach to court security is a problem in state courts 
nationwide.  The National Center for State Courts, a service organization that often 
serves as a clearinghouse for state court best practices in the realm of court security and 
general judicial administration, is not aware of a method for quantifying risk in 
courthouse facilities.5  This creates a significant problem in state court systems, where 
court security is often substandard.  While it may create less of an issue in small state 
court systems, it represents a significant deficiency in court systems with hundreds of 
facilities for which they must manage security, such as California, Texas, or New York.   
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
If we cannot ensure the safety of the all participants in the judicial process, 
we cannot maintain the integrity of the system, we cannot — in sum — 
‘establish justice,’ as mandated in the preamble to the Constitution of the 
United States. 
—Joint Statement of former U.S. Supreme Court Justice Warren Burger 
and former U.S. Attorney General William French Smith 
The previous quote was taken from a 1982 Department of Justice Report of the 
Attorney General’s Task Force on Court Security.6  This report called for the 
                                                 
5 Steve Berson, Court Management Consultant for the National Center for State Courts, email 
communication with author, March 19-27, 2007. 
6 Department of Justice, Report of the Attorney General’s Task Force on Court Security (Washington 
D.C., 1982). 
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implementation of a strategic risk-based approach to guide federal court security efforts.  
A July 1994 report by the General Accounting Office (GAO) illuminated the fact that key 
elements of the recommendations were, twelve years later, still not in place.7   
Thirteen years following the 1994 GAO report, it is unknown whether a 
comprehensive risk management program has been implemented by the federal judiciary.  
Review of current literature revealed nothing confirming or denying that a risk-based 
approach to federal judicial security is now in place.   
The primary importance of the aforementioned document is that the concept of a 
risk-based approach to securing the judiciary has existed in the public consciousness for 
at least the past twenty five years.  This concept was well recognized in the third branch 
even prior to the terrorist attacks upon the Murrah Federal Building, which shared a 
parking structure with Oklahoma City’s federal courthouse, and the World Trade Center, 
which spurred action in multiple sectors to seriously evaluate physical security.   
While the need for a risk-based approach to judicial branch security has been 
known for well over two decades, precious few state and local courts have embraced the 
concept.  A review of court security plans for state courts nationwide reveals an 
inconsequential number of state courts have embraced the terminology of risk.  In 1991, 
the Arizona Supreme Court approved a Risk Management/Court Security Plan as a goal 
for the Arizona Judicial Branch.8  However, a 2007 interview with a representative from 
the Arizona Administrative Office of the Courts revealed that Arizona’s judiciary does 
not, in fact, utilize a risk-based approach to court security.9  Current judicial security 
efforts in Arizona are not guided by any quantifiable method.  Similarly, the largest 
judiciary in the nation (and the world), the California Judicial Branch, does not yet utilize  
 
 
                                                 
7 General Accounting Office, Federal Judicial Security: Comprehensive Risk-Based Program Should 
Be Fully Implemented, Report to Congressional Requesters (1994), 3. 
8 Arizona Judicial Council’s Committee on Risk Management/Court Security, Risk Management/Court 
Security Plan (Phoenix, December 1991). 
9 Niki O’Keefe, Arizona Administrative Office of the Courts, telephone interview with author, March 
21, 2007. 
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a risk-based approach to court security at the state level.  It is possible some individual 
courts and their security providers may embrace the concept, but it is not implicit at the 
state level.  
In a speech at George Washington University in 2005, the Secretary of the 
Department of Homeland Security discussed risk management in the following terms: 
We must manage risk at the homeland security level. That means 
developing plans and allocating resources in a way that balances security 
and freedom when calculating risks and implementing protections.10 
There is no better sector than the judicial branch — which, by its nature, must be 
committed to freedom and access to justice for all Americans — to embrace the concept 
of risk management.   
The literature explored for this topic falls into four general categories: 
government policy documents and research reports focusing on risk management; 
privately authored books on security protection systems and risk assessment methods; 
news reports and scholarly articles outlining threats posed to judiciary operations; and 
texts and reports generated specifically by and for judicial branch stakeholders. 
1) Government policy documents and research reports focusing on risk 
management 
Government policy and research reports are helpful in setting the stage for the 
current state of risk management research and application to government operations.  
Homeland Security plans for infrastructure protection and risk methodology analysis 
make clear the importance of a risk management approach to homeland security.  These 
reports also help define, to a limited extent, how that approach can be shaped by offering 
an outline of the primary elements of a risk management framework.  Congressional 
Research Service (CRS) and Government Accounting/Accountability Office (GAO) 
reports analyzing the successes and failures of risk management frameworks are useful in 
the development of unique risk-based assessment tools.  It is helpful to know, up front, 
                                                 
10 Michael Chertoff, remarks made to the George Washington University Homeland Security Policy 
Institute, Washington D.C., March 16, 2005. 
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what has or has not worked well in the past.  For example, a GAO report assessing the 
federal judiciary’s incomplete implementation of a risk management framework helps 
identify the pitfalls to avoid in implementing a program.11 
2) Privately authored books on security protection systems and risk assessment 
methods  
Non-governmental literature on the topic of security protection systems offers 
insight into the nexus between risk management and the general field of physical 
security.  An evaluation of the literature highlights the shortcomings of existing risk 
assessment tools, as they relate specifically to the needs of the judiciary.  For example, 
resources such as The Design and Evaluation of Physical Protection Systems12 or Risk 
Management for Security Professionals13 are helpful in identifying the major physical 
systems necessitating evaluation in a risk framework.  The texts are, however, focused on 
the private sector and do not offer specific guidance for conducting risk assessments in 
government facilities.   
3) News reports and scholarly articles outlining threats posed to judiciary 
operations 
News reports and scholarly articles that detail threats to the judiciary underscore 
the importance of developing a formalized approach to securing the third branch of 
government.  Much of the source material in this third category comes from non-
academic news reports of attacks upon courts or judicial stakeholders.  This is important 
to note, as non-academic source material is much more likely to be digested by the 
general public than is academic literature.  News reports detailing bomb threats, attacks 
upon judges and court staff, and fatalities in courthouses can serve a role in lessening 
public confidence in the judiciary.   
 
                                                 
11 General Accounting Office, Federal Judicial Security. 
12 Mary Lynn Garcia, The Design and Evaluation of Physical Protection Systems (Boston: 
Butterworth Heinemann, 2001). 
13 Carl Roper, Risk Management for Security Professionals (Boston: Butterworth Heinemann, 1999). 
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4) Texts and reports generated specifically by and for judicial branch stakeholders 
Texts and reports generated specifically by and for judicial branch stakeholders 
are helpful in assessing the most prevalent vulnerabilities existing in courthouse facilities.  
These known vulnerabilities can be examined as they specifically relate to the California 
court system.  One excellent resource in this category is the wealth of articles focused on 
judicial security contained in the Summer 2001 Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science.14 
A great deal of literature is devoted to exploring the concept of risk management.  
The Department of Homeland Security’s 2006 guidance document, the National 
Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP), is committed to establishing critical infrastructure 
protection programs grounded in risk management principles.15  The plan assigns 
responsibility for critical infrastructure protection to state and local governments, 
particularly “with regard to establishing funding priorities.”16  In January of 2007, the 
Congressional Research Service released a report entitled Risk Management and Critical 
Infrastructure Protection: Assessing, Integrating, and Managing Threats, Vulnerabilities 
and Consequences.17  The CRS report studied methodology and models for successful 
risk management frameworks.  The report’s focus was on integration of the three major 
elements of risk assessment: threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences.   
Although governmental reports and guidance are prevalent in the risk 
management discourse, non-governmental literature has also substantially contributed to 
the dialectic.  One text, The Design and Evaluation of Physical Protection Systems, 
provides a highly complex framework from which to approach risk management.18  The 
need for “expert” evaluators possessing “specialized skills” is conveyed.  Similarly, 
                                                 
14 Don Hardenbergh and Neil Weiner, “Preface,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and 
Social Science, no. 576 (July 2001). 
15 Department of Homeland Security, National Infrastructure Protection Plan (2006), 15. 
16Ibid., 23. 
17 Congressional Research Service, Risk Management and Critical Infrastructure Protection: 
Assessing, Integrating, and Managing Threats, Vulnerabilities and Consequences (Washington D.C., 
2007). 
18 Garcia, The Design and Evaluation of Physical Protection Systems, 274. 
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another treatise on the topic, Critical Infrastructure Protection in Homeland Security, 
proposes a network approach to risk assessment and vulnerability analysis which requires 
no small amount of specialized skill and instruction to master.19  While both methods 
may be highly useful for technically proficient risk managers and security professionals, 
they are not likely to be well received in the field of court security.20   
Risk is defined mathematically as the threat of an attack multiplied by the 
vulnerability of an attack multiplied by the consequences of an attack or: 
Risk [R] = Threat [T] x Vulnerability [V] x Consequences [C]21 
To better understand risk management in the judiciary, it is necessary to break down each 
of the components of the risk equation and relate them to the judicial environment.   
1. Threat 
Threats are indications or events with the potential to cause loss of, or damage to, 
an asset.22  Courts have, throughout the ages, been under threat from anti-government 
extremists, everyday criminals, and irate family court litigants.  A review of violent 
incidents in the courts reveals a plethora of evidence of consummated threats to the third 
branch of government.   
• In the early 1990s, a drunk-driving defendant in Florida pulled a gun on a 
judge and shot the courtroom bailiff, who tried to intervene.23 
• On the same day in 1992, three separate incidents occurred in courtrooms 
across the country: a man in North Dakota shot and seriously wounded a 
judge, a man in Missouri shot and killed his wife while waiting for court to 
begin, and a man was shot in the shoulder during an argument in an Alabama 
courthouse.24  
                                                 
19 Ted Lewis, Critical Infrastructure Protection in Homeland Security (Hoboken: John Wiley and 
Sons, 2006). 
20 The majority of court security professionals are deputy-level Sheriff’s department staff, generally 
not at a stage in their careers where they are likely to possess acute knowledge of complex critical 
infrastructure protection schema or risk management frameworks.  
21 Office of Domestic Preparedness, Vulnerability Assessment Methodologies Report (Washington 
D.C., 2003), 11. 
22 Ibid. 




Figure 1.   In 1997, a man hurled a firebomb into a courtroom in Champaign, Illinois, 
causing extensive damage to the courtroom.25 
 
• In August of 2004, a convicted counterfeiter with a grudge against the court 
system was arrested on charges of plotting to blow up the federal courthouse 
in Chicago.26 
• In February of 2005, a partially ignited firebomb was found and dismantled 
outside of the Placer County Courthouse in California.27  The Earth Liberation 
Front claimed responsibility for the attempted bombing. 
• In March of 2005, a judge, a court reporter, and a court security officer were 
shot and killed by defendant Brian Nichols in Fulton County, Georgia.28   
• In April of 2006, two brothers were arrested after plotting to blow up a 
courthouse in Rice County, Minnesota.  The brothers were disgruntled former 
litigants who had two propane tanks filled with propane and fertilizer, in 
preparation for the bomb attack.29 
• In June of 2006, a judge was shot by a disgruntled family court litigant while 
standing in front of a window on the third floor of a courthouse in Reno, 
Nevada.30 
                                                 
25 Mary Ann Barton, “Can you afford to neglect security at your courthouse?” County News Online, 
no. 8 (1997). 
26 Associated Press, Counterfeiter Accused of Courthouse Bomb Plot in Chicago, August 5, 2004, 
http://www.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2004/8/5/143448.shtml (accessed May 6, 2007). 
27 Associated Press, Pipe Bomb Dismantled at Calif. DMV Office, February 16, 2005, 
http://www.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2005/2/16/94307.shtml (accessed May 6, 2007). 
28 Larry Copeland, “I could tell he was going to shoot everybody,” USAToday.com, 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2005-03-13-ga-courthouse_x.htm (accessed March 9, 2007). 
29 Karna M. Peters, “Responding to Rhetoric Against Judges,” Bench & Bar of Minnesota 63, no. 6 
(2006). 
30 Associated Press, Reno Police look for suspect in judge shooting, June 12, 2006. 
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,199176,00.html (accessed March 26, 2007). 
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• In August of 2006, an anti-government crusader sent letters containing what 
was purported to be anthrax to two California courts.  Operations were shut 
down for an entire day in one affected court and for three hours in the other.31   
The threat of violence to courts is incontrovertible.  While the threat is plain, the 
quantification of that threat is much harder to fathom.  In order to conduct a risk 
assessment, quantification of threat is necessary.  What is lacking in the existing literature 
is a standardized method for quantifying threat information.  One afore referenced text, 
The Design and Evaluation of Physical Protection Systems, offers a method to 
qualitatively assign a rating (high, medium, low) to threats.32  However, there is not a 
subsequent quantification of threat information explored in the literature.   
In order to adequately utilize a risk-based approach to evaluating security, it is 
necessary to employ a quantitative ranking system.  What the literature does not relay, 
but which must be explored, is the translation of qualitative assessments (high, medium, 
low) to quantitative values (e.g., 1, .5, 0).   
Understanding threats to the judiciary can lead to efforts to protect facilities and 
branch personnel against those threats.  Two examples from the literature will illustrate 
this truism.  Both examples elucidate how proper protection against identified threats can 
reduce risk to judiciary operations.   
In April of 2005, cookies mailed to the Supreme Court in Washington D.C. 
contained enough rat poison to kill all nine justices.  All mail to the Supreme Court is 
screened, and the justices never received the packages of poison-laced cookies.33    
In June 2005, a man brought a loaded AK-47 to a courthouse in Tyler, Texas, to 
confront his estranged wife and her son.  The court employed entrance screening and the 
perpetrator did not enter the courthouse.  Unfortunately, he shot and killed his victims 
outside of the courthouse.34  However tragic the result, the lesson in this particular case is 
                                                 
31 Anecdotal evidence relayed to author from court executive officers in the two affected courts. 
32 Garcia, The Design and Evaluation of Physical Protection Systems, 33-35. 
33 Kevin Bohn, “O'Connor details half-baked attempt to kill Supreme Court,” CNN.com, November 
17, 2006, http://www.cnn.com/2006/LAW/11/17/court.cookies/index.html (accessed March 9, 2007). 
34 KLTV 7, Three Killed, Including Gunman, In Smith County Courthouse Shoot-out In Tyler, 
http://www.kltv.com/Global/story.asp?S=2994393 (accessed March 9, 2007). 
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that the perpetrator did not wreak his havoc inside the courthouse.  He was thwarted from 
doing so by security measures appropriate to counter the existing threat.   
2. Vulnerability  
Vulnerability is a weakness that can be exploited to gain access to an asset.35  
That access may be gained to carry out a threat.  In any discussion of vulnerability in the 
judicial arena, it is necessary to define the parameters of the protected space.  Justice does 
not begin and end at the courthouse door.  Judicial officers, court staff, attorneys, and 
court security officers go home at night to their families, participate in social events, and 
live lives in the public view.  Oftentimes, judicial officers are under threat from irate 
litigants who may attempt to cause them harm away from the courthouse.  One 
particularly brutal example of this is the 2005 murders of Judge Joan Lefkow’s husband 
and mother in their home.36  The perpetrator had intended to kill the judge herself for 
having dismissed his case.   
There is no dispute that judicial officers are vulnerable away from the courthouse 
setting.  For the purposes of this research, however, the focus will be upon vulnerabilities 
within the courthouse setting, where judges, witnesses, court security officers, attorneys, 
litigants, inmates, jurors, and others all congregate.  The courthouse facility will serve as 
the focal point for vulnerability analysis.   
With this understanding, it is prudent to review literature relative to courthouse 
facility vulnerabilities.  The literature on this topic is expansive.  Numerous books, 
articles, and government documents address the need to identify vulnerabilities in the 
courts.  Court Security: A Guide for Post 9-11 Environments is one such example.37  An 
article written by Randall Atlas, Designing for Security in Courthouses of the Future, 
followed on the heels of the Oklahoma City bombing and serves as an additional guide in 
                                                 
35 Office of Domestic Preparedness, Vulnerability Assessment Methodologies Report, 11. 
36 Jeff Coen and David Heinzmann, “Police: DNA matches: Top cop says evidence, suicide notes 
solve Lefkow slayings,” Chicago Tribune, March 11, 2005, 
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/specials/chi-0503110284mar11,1,1817591.story?coll=chi-
newsspecials-hed (accessed October 23, 2006). 
37 Tony L. Jones, Court Security: A Guide for Post 9-11 Environments (Springfield, Ill: Charles C. 
Thomas Publisher, Ltd, 2003). 
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the field of courthouse vulnerability analysis.38  Checklists and information written by the 
National Sheriff’s Association are also useful in the endeavor to evaluate vulnerabilities 
to courthouses.39   
On a related note, there are numerous books in the more general field of physical 
security containing lessons that can be applied to the court environment, such as The 
Design and Evaluation of Physical Protection Systems.40   
While all of the cited literature is helpful in determining what aspects of physical 
security to focus upon while conducting vulnerability analyses, the discourse is clearly 
lacking methods for quantification.  While it may be well understood, for example, that a 
courthouse should possess entrance screening and alarm its emergency exits, no method 
exists to assign a numerical value to courts that do or do not possess such systems, or 
employ limited entrance screening.  Neither the National Center for State Courts,41 nor 
the U.S. Marshals have a method for quantifying vulnerability.42  This is problematic.  In 
order to conduct a risk analysis, vulnerabilities must be quantified, just as threats and 
consequences must be.  This will assist courts in making prudent resource allocations and 
clearly identify branch-wide priority vulnerabilities.   
3. Consequences 
The impact to the owner in case of loss or damage to an asset defines the 
consequences element of the risk analysis equation. 43  Information and guidance on how 
to conceptualize consequences, as they relate to judiciary operations, is nearly 
nonexistent. According to the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP), the four 
primary concerns relative to consequence assessment are: 
                                                 
38 Randall Atlas, “Designing for Security in Courthouses of the Future,” Fifth National Court 
Technology Conference for the National Center for State Courts, September 1997. 
39 National Sheriff’s Association, Physical Security Checklist, 1999. 
40 Garcia, The Design and Evaluation of Physical Protection Systems. 
41 Steve Berson, Court Management Consultant for the National Center for State Courts, email 
communication with author, March 19-27, 2007. 
42 Nancy Aschbrenner, U.S. Marshal, Judicial Security Division Chief, Los Angeles District, interview 
by author, November 13, 2006. 
43 Office of Domestic Preparedness, Vulnerability Assessment, 11. 
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• Human Impact (such as fatalities or injuries) 
• Economic Impact: Direct and indirect effects on the economy  
• Impact on Public Confidence 
• Impact on Government Capability: Effect on the government’s ability to maintain 
order and deliver minimum essential public services44  
 
While helpful in determining what types of consequences to focus upon while 
conducting risk assessments, the NIPP does not guide the end user toward a methodology 
to quantify consequences in the fulfillment of the risk assessment equation.  This 
deficiency was highlighted in the January 2007 report by the Congressional Research 
Service: 
. . .the NIPP states that assessment methodologies are required and that 
some standards for estimating consequences need to be developed.  
However . . .the NIPP offers little in way of setting standards for what 
measures to use, and the assumptions that need to be made.45 
The question then remains: How does one measure the consequence of the loss of a 
courthouse, temporarily or long term?   
The question is a variant of others posed earlier in this literature review: How 
does one quantify threats to the courts?  Vulnerabilities?  A method for quantifying all 
aspects of the risk management framework, with specific focus on judiciary operations, 
has yet to be developed.   
C. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH TO HOMELAND SECURITY 
This research fills a crucial gap in the existing compendium of court security-
related discourse and links the unique nature of the judicial branch security to the 
Department of Homeland Security issues and goals.  The judiciary, as an independent 
branch of government, is often not considered a partner in the overall effort to enhance 
                                                 
44 Department of Homeland Security, National Infrastructure Protection Plan, 37. 
45 Congressional Research Service, “Risk Management and Critical Infrastructure Protection: 
Assessing, Integrating, and Managing Threats, Vulnerabilities and Consequences” (Washington D.C., 
2007), 22. 
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homeland security (HS), set HS policy, and define objectives for critical infrastructure 
protection.  This analysis contributes to the nascent discourse on the role of homeland 
security goals and policies to judicial branch security operations.  
The primary audience for this research is state court security managers, risk 
management professionals working in the field of judicial operations, and judicial branch 
budget departments.  This thesis also appeals, more globally, to government risk 
assessors and security professionals. 
The role of the judiciary to protect the rule of law and the rights and freedoms of 
the people it serves is as vitally important to the functioning of government as are the 
deliberations of the legislative branch and the authority vested in the executive.  
Therefore, security of the judiciary should be researched and invested in on par with the 
other two branches of government. 
Two primary goals of the Department of Homeland Security are: 
• Prevention — Detect, deter and mitigate threats to our homeland.  
• Protection — Safeguard our people and their freedoms, critical infrastructure, 
property and the economy of our nation from acts of terrorism, natural disasters, 
or other emergencies.  
Consequently, the focus of this thesis is to develop and test an approach to risk 
management that will enhance prevention and protection efforts within the judiciary, in 
line with the goals of the Department of Homeland Security.  Additionally, the research 
contributes to the growing body of homeland security literature surrounding critical 
infrastructure protection and risk management.  The focus upon judicial branch critical 
infrastructure protection is a new direction in this field.   
D. METHOD  
The methodology utilized in this thesis includes the development of a risk 
assessment decision support tool, incident analysis, interviews, and surveys.   
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Development of a risk assessment decision support tool  
Various existing risk management frameworks and assessment models are studied 
and a hybrid risk assessment tool is developed and tested.  The application of this 
decision support tool allows for an ordinal ranking of court-security-related projects, 
useful for prioritizing budget allocations in a fair and sensible manner. A beta-test of four 
California courts vets the viability of the tool.  The results of the beta-test are synthesized 
and risk mitigation is proposed for the most at-risk court.   
 
Incident Analysis 
A comprehensive review of incidents occurring in state courts throughout the past 
ten years determined the most common threats to a judiciary system.  This forms the 
basis for the threat component of the risk assessment tool.  
 
Interviews 
Interviews are conducted with subject matter experts, primarily in the disciplines 
of risk management and court security.  The interviews focus on understanding current 
efforts in the risk management field and the nexus of those efforts to court security.  
Interview results aid in the development of the court security risk assessment tool 
produced in the thesis. 
 
Surveys 
Two surveys are utilized in this thesis to develop the quantification component of 
the risk assessment tool.  One survey queries individuals in leadership positions in 
California courts and court security managers to assign numerical values to the threats 
common to court systems, in order of severity.  The resulting values quantify the 
qualitative threats posed to judiciaries.  A second survey asks court security specialists 
from the California Administrative Office of the Courts and state court security managers 
to rank the vulnerabilities most commonly existent in the courts.  The resulting values 
quantify the qualitative vulnerabilities posed to judiciaries. 
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E. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
The second chapter in this thesis explores the relationship between homeland 
security and the implementation of a risk-based approach to court security.  Chapter III of 
this thesis identifies threats most common to courts and proposes a method for 
quantifying those threats.  Chapter IV identifies the vulnerabilities most common to court 
facilities and proposes a method for quantifying those vulnerabilities.  Chapter V probes 
consequence assessment in judiciary operations and proposes a method to quantify 
consequences.  Chapter VI discusses the beta-test of the proposed risk assessment 
decision support tool to four California courts and outlines recommendations to improve 
security in the most at-risk court, as identified by the tool.  Chapter VII summarizes the 
results of this research effort, discusses the application of the risk assessment tool, and 
offers recommendations for future research and development.   
Throughout this research, the California court system is the exemplar court 
system, due to accessibility by the author.  Despite the focus upon the California court 
experience, the risk-based approach advanced in this thesis and the decision support tool 
developed herein can be utilized by all judicial systems.   
 18
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II. RISK MANAGEMENT IN THE JUDICIARY AND 
HOMELAND SECURITY GOALS 
A.  THE JUDICIARY AND HOMELAND SECURITY 
The relationship of the judicial security field to homeland security objectives and 
efforts has not been appropriately explored.  The alignment of goals between the two 
fields is considerable.  Critical asset protection, disaster preparedness, prevention of 
terrorist attacks — all are homeland security goals that are vitally important to court 
security managers.  Perhaps most importantly, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 
7 identifies government facilities as part of the nation’s critical infrastructure/key 
resources.46  The preservation of critical infrastructure is vital to the nation’s security and 
way of life.47  As critical infrastructure, the courts “guarantee our national security and 
freedom, and administer key public functions.”48  A terrorist attack upon even one 
courthouse represents an attack upon the institution of government itself.  Additionally, 
one’s constitutional right to a fair, speedy, and public trial is reliant upon the existence of 
a court system.  Court systems are comprised of courthouses, judicial officers, staffing, 
administrative processes, and, of course, the citizenry (as jurors, visitors, litigants, 
attorneys, etc.).  The destruction of one or many links in the system may serve to 
effectively retard justice.  Even a temporary disruption may cause grave damage to 
confidence in the judiciary, which is fundamental to the preservation of constitutional 
rights.   
The importance of the judiciary to the proper functioning of government is 
evident.  Unfortunately, the current relationship between the judiciary and homeland 
security is ill defined.    
 
                                                 
46  President, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 (Washington D.C., 2003). 
47 Department of Homeland Security, National Infrastructure Protection Plan, 1. 
48 Office of Homeland Security, National Strategy for Homeland Security (Washington D.C., 2002), 
30.  
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An informal survey of state court leaders at the October 2006 Western Conference 
of State Court Administrators (COSCA) revealed that not one out of the thirteen 
represented states enjoyed any kind of regular dialogue with their counterparts in state 
homeland security departments.49  In the California courts, the largest judiciary in the 
world, this lack of collaboration is perplexing.  With over four hundred and fifty 
government facilities and twenty-two thousand government employees in the judicial 
branch, homeland security critical asset protection efforts should be vitally linked to 
judicial branch operations.   
In addition to government asset protection concerns, threats faced by state courts 
throughout the country, including California, could result in significant loss of civilian 
life.  The bomb plot uncovered in Rice County, Minnesota, for example, could have 
easily resulted in over a hundred deaths, on scale with the devastation of the Alfred P. 
Murrah bombing in Oklahoma in 1995.50  The firebomb dismantled outside of the Placer 
County courthouse could have easily injured civilians, as well as court staff and judicial 
officers.  Indeed, an attack on a courthouse could have a huge civilian loss of life factor.  
The downtown Los Angeles courthouse houses over one hundred courtrooms.  In 
addition to courtrooms, large public areas are devoted to caseload filing, jury assembly, 
the payment of traffic fines and civil assessment fees, etc.  At any one time, thousands of 
people may be in the courthouse.  A successful bomb detonation in the underground 
parking lot could result in copious deaths.   
B. BUDGET ALLOCATION  
A major problem facing professionals who work in the judicial branch security 
field is the lack of a big picture view of what security concerns are present in courthouses 
throughout a judicial system.  In California, with over 450 court facilities, it is all too 
easy for myopia to guide security upgrade funding allocations.  The needs of one facility 
may appear dire at first blush.  For example, one court’s holding cell area may have a rear 
                                                 
49 Survey of state court leaders from thirteen western states accomplished by author at the Western 
Conference of State Court Administrators (Napa, CA: October 2006). 
50 Peters, “Responding to Rhetoric Against Judges.” 
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emergency exit door, which has been used by two in-custody inmates to escape over the 
past year and a half.  If available, funding may be immediately allocated to correct this 
serious deficiency and enclose the area behind the emergency exit door.  Upon further 
examination of courts throughout the state, however, it may be discovered that many 
courts have similar issues in their facilities.  Unfortunately, funding is not limitless and 
not all courts suffering similar maladies will be administered the same prescription.   
Currently, no process exists by which to evaluate the security situation present in 
the judiciary from a global perspective.  How many courts have emergency exit doors 
that have served as escape routes for inmates?  Of those, are there mitigating factors that 
would make one court a better candidate for immediate funding than another?  For 
example, perhaps one court has been subject to escape attempts in the past. 
The importance of being able to responsibly allocated security funding in a court 
system the size of California’s cannot be minimized.  Funding efforts must be judicious 
and transparent, as the branch is responsible to state constituents for allocation of funding 
derived from state taxes.  In fiscal year 2006-2007, the California judicial branch 
received $3.4 billion in funding.51  Over $500 million was allocated to security 
expenditures, including court security staffing and security upgrade funding.  Ensuring 
judicial security funding dollars are being allocated in a responsible, transparent, and 
answerable manner is imperative.  Implementation of a risk-based approach to help 
achieve standardization and transparency in decision making is a major step in the 
overarching goal of achieving judicious court security funding allocations. 
C.  TARGETED SECURITY ENHANCEMENT PROJECTS 
One reason it is extremely important to have a global picture of the security needs 
throughout the state of California’s judicial branch is to garner political support and 
budget funding increases targeted to reducing risk comprehensively throughout the court 
system.  This model was effectively implemented in the judiciary’s 2006 effort to acquire 
funding for entrance screening stations in trial courts throughout the state.   
                                                 
51 Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger, 2006-07 Budget Act (Sacramento, CA, June 30, 2006). 
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A best practice in court security management is that screening personnel for 
weapons and contraband prior to entry into a building is vitally important to enhancing 
the security profile of that facility.52  In 2005, the Administrative Office of the Courts 
conducted a survey of the fifty-eight courts throughout California to determine how many 
court facilities were lacking entrance screening stations.  The survey determined that 
ninety-seven facilities throughout the state lacked such screening.  As a result, the 
Judicial Council of California, the constitutional policy-making body of the judicial 
branch, requested a special allocation in the 2006-2007 Budget Act to procure entrance 
screening equipment and staffing for those deficient facilities.  Presented with firm data 
and verified need, both the legislature and the governor agreed to provide funding for the 
entrance screening stations.  The Budget Act of 2006-2007 included $18.7 million in 
funding to ameliorate this shortcoming.53   
Success stories like the preceding are much more likely to be replicated if the 
legislative and executive branches are presented with convincing and articulate requests 
from the judiciary.  Utilizing a risk-based methodology that clearly weighs threats, 
vulnerabilities, and consequences to arrive at a global picture of existing deficiencies will 
greatly assist in the justification of identified court security improvement funding 
requests. 
D. CURRENT EFFORTS IN THE COURT SECURITY FIELD 
The Court Security Improvement Act of 2007, federal legislation enacted in 
December of 2007, highlights the necessity for state courts to be able to demonstrate need 
for court security improvements. The legislation allows for $20 million in grant funding, 
per year through 2012, to be allocated to state courts for the express purpose of enhancing 
court security. 54  The law states: “Priority shall be given to State court applicants under 
                                                 
52 Griebel and Phillips, “Architectural Design for Security in Courthouse Facilities,” 123-124. 
53 Governor Arnold Schwarzenneger, Governor’s Budget Summary 2007-2008 (Sacramento, CA, 
January 2007). 
54 One Hundred Tenth Congress of the United States of America, Court Security Improvement Act of 
2007 (Washington D.C., 2007), http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=h110-660 (accessed 
February 12, 2008). 
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subsection (a)(4) that have the greatest demonstrated need to provide security in order to 
administer justice.”55 The legislation does not define how “the greatest demonstrated 
need” shall be authenticated.  However, as discussed in Chapter I, the Department of 
Homeland Security has focused on a risk-based model for resource allocation.56  If HS 
funding is to be tied to risk management, so too, one could assume, should federally-
granted security funding for the state courts.  State courts taking an early lead in 
implementing such an approach to court security will, therefore, be in a better position to 
secure federal grant funding upon passage of the Court Security Improvement Act.   
Specifically, the National Infrastructure Protection Plan guides the process the 
courts may use to implement a risk-based approach to court security.  The cornerstone of 
the plan is its risk management framework.   The NIPP’s framework is multi-faceted and 
features a continuous feedback loop to ensure constant improvement of the risk 
management process.57   
 
 
Figure 2.   National Infrastructure Protection Plan Risk Management Framework. 
 
                                                 
55 One Hundred Tenth Congress of the United States of America, Court Security Improvement Act. 
56 Michael Chertoff (U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security), remarks made to the George Washington 
University Homeland Security Policy Institute, Washington D.C., March 16, 2005. 
57 Department of Homeland Security, National Infrastructure Protection Plan, 4. 
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The entire Risk Management Framework is essential to harmonizing court 
security goals with those of homeland security.  Although all steps are discussed to some 
extent, this thesis focuses upon steps one through three of the Risk Management 
Framework.  Setting security goals is the baseline step for any protection program, 
whether in the field of physical, cyber, or personal security.  This step is included in 
Section F of this chapter.  Asset identification in the California courts has been 
accomplished, and detailed information about each court facility resides within the 
Administrative Office of the Courts.  Identification of sub-assets and systems unique to 
each facility is included in the vulnerability assessment portion of this thesis’s proposed 
risk assessment tool.  The majority of this thesis is devoted to step three of the NIPP’s 
Risk Management Framework, assessing risks. 
E. COURT SECURITY GOALS 
Goals for court security encompass a range of factors.  Training for security 
providers, emergency preparedness levels in the court, measures taken for personal 
security — all are crucial to a well-rounded court security plan.  Goals specific to 
physical security, however, provide the baseline of the risk-based approach to court 
security.  The National Sheriffs’ Association offers broad guidance: 
 
Goal: To establish appropriate protection for court staff and facilities, the general public, 
and the judicial process as a whole.58 
Several subordinate goals are important to guide court security risk assessment 
objectives.  A review of literature pertinent to court security planning, including the 
National Strategic Plan for Judicial Branch Security,59 the Mini-Symposium on Court 
Security,60 and the National Center for State Courts Future Trends in State Courts helps 
identify the three primary subordinate goals, which are outlined below: 
                                                 
58 National Sheriffs' Association, Court Security: A Manual of Guidelines and Procedures 
(Washington, DC: Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, 1978). 
59 Pamela Casey, A National Strategic Plan for Judicial Branch Security (Washington D.C., 2006). 
60 Dow Constantine, “Mini-Symposium on Court Security: Citizens Have a Right to Safety in the 
Courthouse,” The Justice System Journal 28, no. 1 (2007), 23. 
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Goal:   Prevent the introduction of weapons and contraband into the courthouse. 
Goal:  Provide secure circulation zones for the separation of judicial officers, inmates, 
court staff, and members of the public. 
Goal: Leverage technology to provide for immediate annunciation of emergency 
situations and to assist in terrorism-prevention efforts. 
One method that will greatly assist the judiciary in achieving these goals is the 
systematic application of a risk-based approach to court security, spurred by the 
development of a decision support risk assessment tool.  A clear identification of the 
threats, vulnerabilities, and potential consequences of an attack upon a courthouse will 
help court security managers evaluate and implement appropriate protection for the 
judicial process and its resources.  The following three chapters will examine each 
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III. THREATS TO THE JUDICIARY 
Any analysis of threats posed to a specific sector must focus upon at least three 
factors.  First, a definition of whom or what is primarily threatened in the sector must be 
understood.  Second, the primary group or party responsible for the threats posed shall be 
identified.  Finally, an examination of the manner of threats posed to the sector shall be 
undertaken.61    
It is feasible to examine the first two factors conjointly.  Who is threatened is 
largely defined by the individual carrying out the threatening behavior.62  The third 
factor, identification of the existing threats, is the first element in the Risk equation.   
Risk [R] = Threat [T] x Vulnerability [V] x Consequences [C]63  
A.  THOSE WHO THREATEN THE JUDICIARY 
Threats are often defined by the types of individual who pose them (e.g., Islamic 
extremists, anti-abortion zealots).  A wide range of individuals pose threats to the 
judiciary.   In general, the primary purveyors of violence in the judiciary are individuals 
who are a party to cases before the courts.  Aside from gender, however, there are few 
commonalities among those who commit violence in the courts. 64   An examination of 
threats made in the federal courts from 1789 to 1993 included a breakdown of the 
threateners by race.65  Although the federal judiciary represents an environment that is  
 
 
                                                 
61 For the purposes of this thesis, threats will be confined to human-generated incidents.  Although 
natural disasters present a grave threat to judicial operations, as illustrated by the devastating effects of 
Hurricane Katrina upon the functioning of the Louisiana courts, an analysis of naturally-occurring threats is 
beyond the scope of this work. 
62 For example, a family court litigant is more likely to be threatened by an estranged spouse than by 
an anti-government crusader.   
63 Office of Domestic Preparedness, Vulnerability Assessment, 11. 
64 As with violent crime in general, males disproportionately resort to violence in the court setting.   
65 Frederick Calhoun, Hunters and Howlers: Threats and Violence Against Federal Judicial Officials 
in the United States, 1789-1993 (Arlington, VA, 1998), 101. 
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different from a state judiciary, it is reasonable to assume that those who threaten the 
federal court system are not radically dissimilar from those who would threaten state 






Figure 3.   A breakdown of perpetrators in federal courts, 1789–1993. 
 
A comprehensive review of state court-related incidents occurring in the past ten 
years reveals a smorgasbord of individuals who have sought to do harm to state judicial 
officers, court security officers, trial participants, or courts in general.66  Age, race, 
socioeconomic status, and educational background all varied significantly.  While a 1978 
study by the National Sheriff’s Association identified that judges, bailiffs, and attorneys 
were the most likely personnel in courts to be targeted for violence, an extensive review 
of the literature has not revealed a similar study identifying who is most likely to commit 
violence in the courts.67  A few exemplary cases of violence toward judicial officers, 
court security officers, participants, and courts in general will offer a broad overview of 




                                                 
66 Paul Banner, Court Related Incidents (Public Agency Training Council, 2007). 
67 James McMahon, Court Security: A Manual of Guidelines and Procedures (Washington D.C, 
1978).  
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1. Those who threaten judicial officers 
In 2005, Judge Rowland Barnes in Fulton County, Georgia, was shot and killed 
by Brian Nichols, a defendant in a rape trial over which the judge was presiding.68  At the 
time he committed his crime, Brian Nichols was thirty-three years old and making six 
figures as a computer engineer for UPS.69  Mr. Nichols is African American.   
Judge Chuck Weller was shot by Darren Mack in 2006, a party to a divorce 
proceeding in the judge’s court.70  When Darren Mack shot Judge Weller, Mack’s 
estimated net worth was $9.4 million dollars and his annual income was approximately 
$500,000.  The reason Mr. Mack shot Judge Weller is suspected to be that the judge had 
ordered him to pay his wife $10,000 a month in spousal support.71  Darren Mack is 
Caucasian and was forty-five years old at the time of his crime.   
2. Those who threaten court security officers 
In 2006, an inmate, Timothy Jones, appearing in a court in Jackson County, 
Georgia, shot a court security officer three times during an escape attempt.  The African 
American Mr. Jones was twenty-eight years old at the time of the shooting.72    
In 2001 in Orange County, Texas, Keith Gonzales, an inmate seeking to escape 
from custody, shot a court security officer.  Mr. Gonzales was forty-one years old at the 




                                                 
68 Copeland, “I could tell he was going to shoot everybody”. 
69 Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brian_Nichols (accessed March 9, 2007). 
70 Associated Press, Reno Police look for suspect in judge shooting, June 12, 2006, 
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,199176,00.html (accessed March 26, 2007). 
71 Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Darren_Mack (accessed March 19, 2007). 
72 Blair Meeks and Duffie Dixon, “2 Shot at Jackson Co. Courthouse,” 11 Alive News, August 21, 
2006, http://www.11alive.com/news/news_article.aspx?storyid=83626 (accessed March 8, 2007). 
73 Banner, Court Related Incidents. 
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3. Those who threaten participants in proceedings 
In 2000, Edward Lansdale, a defendant in a child molestation charge, shot his 
accuser in the courthouse hallway before turning the gun on himself.  At the time of the 
shooting, the Caucasian Mr. Lansdale was sixty-eight years old.74 
In 2005, David Arroyo fatally shot his estranged wife, Maribel Estrada, as she 
attempted to enter a courthouse in Tyler, Texas.75  The Latino Mr. Arroyo was forty-three 
at the time of the shooting.   
In 2001, Michael Hill shot his former girlfriend and her mother outside the 
courthouse where his child visitation hearing had just been held.  Mr. Hill was a forty-
five-year-old retired Navy officer at the time of the shooting.76   
4. Those who threaten courts in general 
In 2003, Donald Benjamin, armed with a baseball bat and a steak knife, entered a 
courthouse in Georgia and attacked four individuals, none of whom were known to 
him.77  The twenty-four-year-old Mr. Benjamin was on bond at the time of the attack, 
awaiting trial on charges that he beat a police officer.78   
In 2002, Leroy Harris and Charles Chatman sprinkled a non-hazardous powdery 
substance in and around the Saluda County Courthouse in South Carolina.  At the time of 
the offense, termed “use of a hoax device of mass destruction,” Harris was fifty years old 
and Chatman was forty-four.79   
The most important lesson that can be learned from delving into the types of 
individuals that commit crime in the courts is that there does not appear to be a set type 
that can be anticipated and screened. Since it is not productive to focus on identifying 
                                                 
74 Banner, Court Related Incidents. 
75 KLTV 7, Three Killed, Including Gunman In Smith County Courthouse Shoot-out In Tyler. 
76 Banner, Court Related Incidents. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Dave Miller, “Man injures four in courthouse,” walb.com  
http://www.walb.com/global/story.asp?s=1449497&ClientType=Printable (accessed July 29, 2007). 
79 Banner, Court Related Incidents. 
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who poses a threat to courts, it is imperative to recognize the manner of threats that are 
most common in the courts, in an effort to focus court security efforts on the alleviation 
of threats.80   
B. TYPES OF THREATS    
A review of courthouse incidents over the past ten years underscores the types of 
threats occurring most frequently in the nation’s state court facilities.  Of the surveyed 
incidents in state court facilities, the following incidents are the most common:81 
Table 1.   Most common incidents in state court facilities. 
Incident  
Shooting in the courthouse/courtroom 
Other violence resulting in physical harm to judicial officer, 
court staff, juror, witness, litigant, etc. 
Explosive device/bomb/arson in or on courthouse property 
Attempted violence to judicial officer, court staff, juror, 




Attempted inmate escape 
 
                                                 
80 This is not to say, of course, that serious efforts can not be made to pre-identify those who may pose 
the greatest threat to courts.  Those responsible for court security should make every effort to work with 
judicial officers and court staff on identifying “at-risk” individuals throughout every step of the judicial 
process. 
81 Banner, Court Related Incidents. 
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C.  QUANTIFICATION METHOD 
Many risk management software programs are on the market today, offering 
computer-guided methodologies to quantify risk factors.  Digital Sandbox, Riskwatch, 
and CounterMeasures are three such programs that include physical security modules.  
These programs are extremely robust and may provide an adequate security risk 
management solution for some court systems.  Other judicial branches may not require a 
highly robust system or possess adequate resources to purchase risk-management 
software.  Regardless of size or fiscal prowess, a judiciary serious about security should 
develop a fundamental understanding of the inter-relationship of the various factors 
comprising a risk assessment.  Entering information into pre-identified fields in a 
computer program may result in a laundry list of protective actions to be taken to enhance 
a court system’s security profile.  However, it is unlikely that assessing risk using this 
method alone will result in a comprehensive understanding of the threats, vulnerabilities, 
and consequences facing a court system.  For a nuanced comprehension of the risks 
prevalent in a court system, it would be beneficial for those tasked with the court security 
mission to undertake a preliminary risk evaluation.  By doing so, court administrators 
will be in a better position to defend against the threats, strengthen the vulnerabilities, and 
prepare for adverse consequences.  This should, therefore, occur in any court system prior 
to utilizing a computer-based program to accomplish risk assessments.82  To do so, it is 
necessary to develop a basic quantification method for each of the three factors.  
Quantifying threats to the judiciary is the first step in this process.  
D.  THREAT QUANTIFICATION 
Identifying who poses a threat to the judiciary is not as productive as identifying 
the types of threats that pose the greatest risk to courts.  The task is to translate frequency 
and severity of threats into a numerical value to be used in the risk equation. 
Based upon their status as government symbols and the highly-charged nature of 
court business, all courts are targets, vulnerable to a range of threats.  There is, therefore, 
                                                 
82 Smaller and under-resourced court systems may find that this method of risk assessment is robust 
enough to meet the judiciary’s needs.   
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no zero-risk equation in the field of court security risk assessment.  Some courts, 
however, are likely to be more vulnerable to certain threats based upon a range of factors.  
Those factors may include the type of cases heard in the court (i.e., criminal court vs. 
traffic court), the location of the court (easily recognizable downtown facility vs. 
nondescript storefront), the nature of the community served by the court (the central front 
in a gang-warfare zone vs. a small-town, law-abiding community), and a plethora of 
others.  A detailed threat assessment could evaluate all of the aforementioned factors 
individually.  However, the scope of this exposition will focus on a specific method for 
characterizing threat: the historical record of security incidents in court facilities.  This 
method has been recognized by the General Accountability Office as a viable rubric by 
which to anticipate threats to a sector.83  To accomplish a practicable threat assessment, 
the risk manager must utilize information from the local law enforcement and intelligence 
community serving the court system.  Local law enforcement will be able to provide 
historical data (i.e., number of bomb threats, inmate escapes, etc.) necessary to complete 
the assessment.  In the California court system, for example, this requires the 
participation of numerous different agencies, including fifty-eight different sheriff’s 
departments, two court marshal’s services, the California Highway Patrol, and an 
unknown number of municipal police departments.   
To normalize the data over a measurable timeline, threats occurring over the past 
five years should be included in the assessment.84  The number of points assigned per 
incident depend upon the severity of the threat, on a scale from one to five. Examples of 
high-threat events are those that would result in high numbers of casualties or a 




                                                 
83 General Accounting Office, Combating Terrorism: Threat and Risk Assessments Can Help 
Prioritize and Target Program Investments (Washington D.C., April 1998), 23. 
84 Five years is an appropriate timeline for two primary reasons.  Based upon experience conducting 
historical surveys in the courts, it is unlikely reliable data will be available much beyond five years.  
Additionally, incidents recorded many years ago are less likely to be representative of current threats.   
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survey responses of twenty-four members of the California Court Security Network 
Listserve, a group of court security officers and court staff security liaisons from 
throughout the state.85   
The total of all threats, once aggregated and normalized, are factored into the 
overall risk management equation.  The possibility exists that a court may end up with 
zero points on the threat scale, if, over the past five years, the court has not been subject 
to any of the incidents in the threat-assessment tool.  However, the simple fact of not 
having been exposed to incidents in the past five years does not translate to a complete 
lack of risk.  All courts, by virtue of their mission and accessibility to the public, are 
potentially under threat of attack.  Therefore, each court shall receive a baseline number 
of two threat points, representing the lowest level of potential threat.   
Based upon the review of the most common incidents occurring in the nation’s 
state courts over the past ten years and the Court Security Network Listserve survey, the 
following quantification framework has been developed.   
Table 2.   Threat Quantification Framework. 
Incident 
# of incidents 
occurring within 




# of incidents x 
point value per 
incident 
Explosive device/bomb in or on 
courthouse property  5  
Shooting in the 
courthouse/courtroom  5  
Hostage situation  4  
Inmate escape  4  
Other violence resulting in 
physical harm to judicial officer, 
court staff, juror, witness, 
litigant, etc. 
 4  
                                                 
85 Survey respondents were asked to assign a value of one to five (one being the least severe and five 
being the most severe) to the most common threats facing the judiciary.  Responses for each threat measure 
were averaged to achieve a point value for each threat.  A detailed explanation of the survey is located in 
Appendix I. 
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Attempted shooting in 
courthouse/courtroom   4  
Attempted violence to judicial 
officer, court staff, juror, 
witness, litigant, etc. 
 3  
Attempted hostage situation  3  
Attempted inmate escape  3  







A value of two on the threat scale indicates the lowest threat, relative to the other 
threats included in the risk assessment tool.  A score of three represents moderate threat 
on the scale; a score of four represent high threat; and a score of five represents a critical 
threat on the scale.   
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IV. VULNERABILITIES IN THE JUDICIARY 
The second factor that must be analyzed in a comprehensive risk assessment is 
vulnerability.  A vulnerability is a weakness that can be exploited to gain access to an 
asset.86   
Risk [R] = Threat [T] x Vulnerability [V] x Consequences [C]87  
Vulnerabilities abound in court facilities.  An examination of the most common 
types of vulnerabilities and a method to quantify those vulnerabilities are important steps 
in the goal of creating a risk-based approach to court security.  As the exemplar court 
system analyzed in this thesis, vulnerabilities in the California judicial branch will be 
specifically explored.  It is logical to assume that other judicial branch entities possess 
similar vulnerabilities to those present in California.   
A.  THE STATE OF JUDICIARY FACILITIES IN CALIFORNIA 
The greatest impediment to the provision of adequate security throughout the 
California state courts are the court facilities themselves.  Many state court facilities are 
historic in nature and feature architectural attributes which run counter to the principles 
of security.  A full 35 percent of all California court facilities were built prior to 1970.88  
Courthouse construction in California prior to 1970 was focused on providing access to 
justice and on making the courthouse the center of civic life.  Security was not a major 
concern in California courthouse construction until the 1970 hostage taking and murder 
of a judge in the Marin County Courthouse.  The courthouse, designed by famous 
architect Frank Lloyd Wright in 1968, did not feature entrance screening in 1970.89  The 
judge’s murderer brought several weapons in the front door of the facility, through the 
                                                 
86 Office of Domestic Preparedness, Vulnerability Assessment, 11. 
87 Ibid. 
88 California Administrative Office of the Courts, Court Facility Listing, November 2006. 
89 In fact, entrance screening was not emplaced in the Marin County Courthouse until 2006.   
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public hallways, and into the courtroom.90  It was not until after this event that 
courthouse construction became more focused on security in California.   
Two representative examples of California judicial facilities may best illustrate 
the challenge of securing historic court facilities.  The courthouse pictured below (Figure 
4) was constructed in the 1920s.  A registered national historic landmark, it features daily 
tours attracting thousands of visitors a year, and is one of the top wedding destinations in 
its county.  It also has seven different points of entry and several open-air access points.  
With no inmate holding area; inmates are walked from a holding facility across the street 
and into the courthouse through a public entry door.  Judges, court staff, jurors, 
witnesses, and inmates all circulate in the same public space.  The landscaping around the 
courthouse, beautifully manicured and maintained by the county’s historical society, 
affords numerous hiding spots for explosive devices.    
 
Figure 4.   An example of a facility that is extremely difficult to secure. 
 
 
                                                 
90 Bettina Aptheker, The Morning Breaks: The Trial of Angela Davis (New York: Cornell University 
Press, 1999), xiii. 
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A further example of a facility ill suited to housing secure court operations is 
pictured in Figure 5.  The one-room courthouse in this facility was formerly a dentist’s 
office.  It currently shares space with a real estate office.  In addition to the oddity that 
every room in the building features its own sink, there is no way to incorporate entrance 
screening in the building, with the current physical makeup.  Additionally, no standoff or 
barriers exist between the court and the street.  Any vehicle could easily drive right into 
the facility.  The door leading into the courtroom opens directly into a perfect view of the 
judge sitting on the bench.   
 
 
Figure 5.   A facility ill suited for court operations. 
 
B. TYPES OF VULNERABILITIES 
The two primary categories of vulnerability to be evaluated within the scope of 
this thesis are those that compromise a court’s general security against risk of personal 
attack, inmate escape, etc., and those that make the court vulnerable to terrorist attack.  In 
many cases, a vulnerability to terrorist attack may concurrently pose a vulnerability to 
general security.  For example, a lack of entrance screening equipment may afford a 
terrorist the opportunity to introduce an explosive device into the court.  At the same 
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time, a lack of entrance screening may allow a disgruntled traffic court litigant to carry a 
knife into the facility, which may be used to attack a traffic court clerk in a fit of rage 
over perceived injustice.  Because many of the vulnerabilities are common to both 
general security deficiencies and terrorism-related deficiencies, no distinction will be 
made between the two categories of vulnerability within the risk assessment tool.  
Although no distinction will be made between categories of vulnerability, explanations of 
the primary types of vulnerabilities existing in courthouses will help define the problem 
facing judicial security. 
1. Facilities-related Vulnerabilities 
The most prevalent facilities-related security inadequacies exist in several key 
areas, including building entry points, inmate delivery areas and holding facilities, and 
circulation control.  Other facility features that impact the vulnerability of a courthouse 
include parking, the presence or absence of security windows at clerk’s counters, 
landscaping, exterior lighting, chambers’ location, and composition of exterior windows. 
Weapons screening 
The building entrance is the first point at which visitors can be screened to ensure 
they are not carrying weapons into the courthouse.  A secure court must have space for 
entrance screening equipment (x-ray and magnetometer) and staff to operate the 
equipment.  A common problem in courts throughout California is a lack of adequate 
space for entrance screening or unusual architectural design features making entrance 
screening difficult to emplace.   
Inmate delivery areas 
Inmate delivery points are potentially very dangerous locations.  Depending upon 
the makeup of the delivery area, the point at which the inmate gets off the bus or van to 
transition into the courthouse may be his or her best opportunity to escape.  This is 
particularly true in courts that do not contain secure access points, such as a sally port.  A 
sally port is a controlled space with two doors, or gates.  To open one gate, the other gate 
must be closed.  Sally ports are ideal inmate delivery areas; the opportunity for inmate 
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escape is drastically lessened by physical controls.  Sally ports are effective at securing 
inmates.  They are also expensive.  Therefore, many California court facilities do not 
have sally ports.  A court’s inmate delivery point may be as primitive as a sidewalk 
painted with the words “Custody Transports Only.”    
 
Figure 6.   Unsecured inmate delivery point. 
 
Inmate holding facilities 
In order to adequately secure inmates and reduce vulnerabilities associated with 
potential escapes or violent incidents, a court should possess an inmate holding facility.  
Courts without inmate holding are forced to rely upon frequent transport of potentially 
violent inmates in and out of the courthouse.  With inmate delivery being one of the most 
dangerous functions accomplished at a courthouse, the lack of inmate holding can 
significantly impact a court’s vulnerability to security incidents.  
Circulation control 
The ideal secure court facility features four separate circulation zones, (1) public, 
(2) court staff, (3) inmate, and (4) interface/courtroom.91  The majority of California 
court facilities do not feature the four distinct separation zones.  Few have completely 
secure inmate control zones.  Many courts have some secure staff areas.  Oftentimes, 
however, staff areas are intermixed with inmate zones.   
                                                 
91 Griebel and Phillips, “Architectural Design for Security in Courthouse Facilities,” 122. 
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Parking 
Courthouses should feature three distinct parking areas, (1) judicial officer 
parking, (2) staff parking, and (3) visitor parking.92  Judges’ parking should be fenced 
completely and situated adjacent to the judge’s entrance into the facility (if such an 
entrance exists).  Staff parking should also be fenced and separate from the public 
parking area.  Many California courts have separate parking areas for judicial officers, 
although the effectiveness of the access controls used to control entry varies widely.  Few 
courts have distinct, secured staff parking.  Many courts have no distinct parking zones.  
Some courts have no parking areas at all and rely upon street parking for all judges, court 
staff, and court visitors.  This is a particular problem for courts built in the late 1800s, 
when vehicles were not in use.  
Security windows at clerk’s counters 
Clerk’s counters are potentially volatile areas, where often angry members of the 
public come to pay fines or request information on court proceedings to which they are a 
party.  Ensuring the security of court clerks staffing public counters can be best 
accomplished by providing separation between the clerks and members of the public.  
This helps protect against the potential for robbery, as well as physically assaultive 
behavior.  Many courts do feature some kind of barrier at their clerks’ counters. Many do 
not.   
Landscaping 
Landscaping around a courthouse can enhance or degrade the facility’s security 
profile.  Lush, overgrown landscaping can serve as a hiding place for explosive devices.  
An example of this occurred in 1997, when an explosive device hidden in bushes outside 
of the Solano County Courthouse in Vallejo was detonated.  The blast shut down court 
operations for a week.93  In order to protect a court against terrorist attacks of this nature, 
landscaping around a court facility should be well-manicured and maintained. 
                                                 
92 Griebel and Phillips, “Architectural Design for Security in Courthouse Facilities,” 121. 
93 Sabra Forbes, Solano County Superior Court Vallejo Branch Manager, interview with author, 
September 6, 2006. 
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Exterior lighting 
Adequate lighting around a courthouse helps decrease the possibility for evening 
attacks or IED emplacement.  Many courts feature little to no exterior lighting.  
Composition of exterior windows and wall panels (i.e., ballistic resistant) 
Ballistic-resistant windows and exterior wall panels help prevent successful 
explosive attacks against participants in court proceedings, judges in chambers, etc.  
Some courts throughout California feature ballistic-resistant material on the exterior 
building walls and windows.  Many do not.   
2. Technological Vulnerabilities 
Technology can greatly assist a court in preventing incidents or with fostering 
more timely response to incidents.  The presence of key electronic security features, such 
as access control systems, duress annunciation systems, closed circuit television cameras 
and monitoring, and intrusion alarms, can help courts increase their security profile.    
Access control system 
An access control system helps ensure courts are limiting access only to 
individuals authorized to be in secure areas of the court.  In some courts, access control 
systems may feature full-blown electronic access controls.  In others, a strict lock and key 
policy serves as the court’s access control.  In some courts, little access control is in 
place.  In one California court, a pincode system is used to control access to secure areas.  
The pincode used to open doors, including those allowing access to courtrooms and 
chambers, has been the same for thirteen years, since the system was first put into 
place.94   
Duress annunciation system 
When an incident occurs in a courtroom, staff area, or inmate holding cell, one 
immediate way to alert first responders is through the use of a duress annunciation 
                                                 
94 Anonymous, Superior Court Facilities Manager, interview with author, April 25, 2007.  
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system, also known as a panic alarm system.  A recent statewide effort to ensure courts 
have duress alarm systems in place has significantly increased the number of facilities 
housing such technology.   
Closed-circuit television cameras and monitoring 
Closed-circuit television (CCTV) cameras, when monitored, can serve as a force 
multiplier in the effort to detect terrorist or criminal activity.  CCTV cameras monitoring 
a courthouse’s exterior and parking areas can be particularly effective in detecting 
suspicious activity before it potentially impacts the court.  The presence and monitoring 
of CCTV varies significantly throughout the state. 
Intrusion alarms 
Intrusion alarms can serve as harbingers of terrorist or criminal activity.  Some 
courts have intrusion alarm systems.  Some do not. 
Policy-related vulnerability 
In addition to architectural features, physical controls, and equipment that can 
enhance or degrade a court’s security profile, the presence or absence of security-focused 
policies can impact a court’s overall security.   
Entrance screening practices 
An entrance screening policy that includes the screening of all personnel entering 
a courthouse, including all employees and visitors, greatly enhances a court’s security 
profile.95  Even judges entering the courthouse through the main entrance should be 
subject to screening.96  Most California courts exempt numerous classifications of 
individuals.  Types of individuals most commonly exempted include court and/or county 
staff, members of the California Bar Association, and off-duty law enforcement officers.   
                                                 
95 AOC Emergency Response and Security, Court Security Best Practices, 5. 
96 Ideally, judges should be afforded a separate, secure entrance entirely, which would exempt them 
from being subject to screening.   
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C.  VULNERABILITY QUANTIFICATION 
From May 2005 through February 2008, 80 percent of the fifty-eight court 
systems in California were visited by the AOC’s Emergency Response and Security unit.  
Security vulnerabilities were observed in approximately 120 court facilities.  Twenty-
nine comprehensive court security surveys were accomplished.  Knowledge gained 
during the court security visits was instrumental in the effort to develop a vulnerability 
quantification method, as was the National Sheriff’s Association Court Security 
Checklist.  The National Sheriff’s Association, court security experts from the Annals of 
the American Academy of Political and Social Science, the National Center for State 
Courts, and the AOC’s Emergency Response and Security unit recognize the importance 
of certain aspects of court security.  The presence or absence of elements of court security 
led to the quantification of easily observable judicial security vulnerabilities.  The 
following vulnerability quantification method is similar to the methodology used to 
quantify threats to the judiciary.  The relative point value of each vulnerability was 
formulated based upon feedback from court security experts from the Emergency 
Response and Security unit within the California Administrative Office of the Courts and 
four court security leaders from the following California County Sheriff’s Departments: 








                                                 
97 A more detailed description of the methodology used to determine the final vulnerability ranking is 
located in Appendix II.   
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Table 3.   Vulnerability Quantification Framework. 
Vulnerability Relative Points Value 
No weapons screening exists 10 
Many exemptions exist to the entrance 
screening policy (i.e., court staff, members of 
the California Bar, county employees) 
7 
No distinct circulation exists (public, staff, 
judges, and inmates mingle) 7 
Partial weapons screening only (i.e., 
screening part time or only with hand wands) 7 
No secure holding facilities exist 7 
No access control system is in place (i.e., 
there is no key control system or card access 
system) 
6 
Sally port (for inmate delivery) is unsecured 6 
No duress annunciation system is in place 6 
Some exemptions exist to the entrance 
screening policy (i.e., court staff, off duty law 
enforcement) 
5 
No secure parking exists for judges and court 
staff 5 
No barrier/partition exists between clerks and 
public 5 
Exterior lighting is greatly lacking or 
nonexistent 5 
Landscaping near facility is overgrown and 
affords opportunity to hide improvised 
explosive devices 
5 
A duress annunciation system exists, but 
reliability is uncertain and/or system is not in 
place in some vulnerable areas 
5 
No ballistic-resistant material exists in 
vulnerable windows or wall paneling 4 
No intrusion alarm system exists 4 
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No CCTV system exists 4 
Partially controlled parking areas exist for 
judges and court staff (i.e., drop arm barrier) 4 
Some access controls are in place, but 
application is not comprehensive 4 
Some, but not all, of the vulnerable windows 
and wall paneling features ballistic-resistant 
material 
4 
Semi-distinct circulation exists (ex. some 
minimal mixing of staff and inmates may 
occur) 
4 
A CCTV system is in place,  is intermittently 
monitored and/or not comprehensive 
throughout the courthouse 
4 
Landscaping is partially trimmed but some 
problem areas exist where improvised 
explosive devices could be hidden 
3 
The sally port is moderately, but not fully, 
secured 3 
Partial clerk’s security windows exist 3 
Exterior lighting partially, but not fully, 
illuminates exterior of courthouse during 
hours of darkness 
2 
 
A score of two on the vulnerability scale represents a low vulnerability, relative to 
the rest of the vulnerabilities in the scale.  A value of three through nine represents a 
medium vulnerability — exploitation of the vulnerability could result in increasingly 
serious damage and/or casualties.  A value of ten represents the greatest vulnerability — 
the presence of this vulnerability could lead to the most serious detrimental effect relative 
to the other vulnerabilities in the scale.   
D.  ASSESSMENT RELIABILITY 
The presence or absence of historical threats to the judiciary is an objective 
measure.  A threat has either occurred in the past or it has not.  A primary impediment to 
proper threat quantification may be the absence of accurate threat data through poor 
record keeping.  However, vulnerability assessment is a markedly more objective 
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enterprise.  Some measures are unequivocal.  For example, full or partial entrance 
screening either exists or it does not.  Many measures are more abstract.  Where one 
person may observe exterior lighting to be adequate, another may deem the lighting 
deficient.  Assessment reliability, therefore, is supremely important in the effort to 
quantify vulnerabilities.   Each assessor must be trained to recognize vulnerabilities in a 
replicable fashion.  For the purposes of this thesis, reliability is ensured by the fact that 
the same expert conducted each assessment.  For this tool to be broadly applicable, 
security managers must ensure that assessors are trained to the same standard.  This could 
be accomplished through a comprehensive training program, which may include site 
visits to representative facilities and/or training by review of pictorial archetypes.  Tests 





The third factor that must be analyzed in a comprehensive risk assessment is 
consequence.  Consequence is defined as the impact, or adverse effect, of loss or damage 
to the asset.98   
Risk [R] = Threat [T] x Vulnerability [V] x Consequences [C]99  
Consequence is the most difficult element of the risk assessment framework to 
quantify.  The National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) stresses the necessity for 
comprehensive risk assessments to include consequence calculation.100  Unfortunately, 
the plan offers no method as to how to best achieve quantification for this important 
factor.101  The NIPP sets out a common set of criteria risk managers may use to evaluate 
the consequences of a terrorist attack upon a sector asset.  Public health and safety, 
economic, psychological, and governmental impacts are all factors that can be measured 
by consequence assessment.  However, it is understood that a full consequence 
assessment may be cumbersome and beyond the capabilities for a given risk analysis.  
Two factors are considered fundamental to a consequences assessment: direct economic 
impact and human impact.102     
A.  DIRECT ECONOMIC IMPACT 
When measuring the economic impact of an attack on a courthouse, it is first 
necessary to set the measurement criteria.  Although an attack resulting in complete 
courthouse destruction is highly unlikely, utilizing a “worst case scenario” approach to 
consequences measurement is the most practicable option.  It would be impossible to 
accurately predict partial loss events.  It would similarly be very difficult to measure lost 
                                                 
98 Office of Domestic Preparedness, Vulnerability Assessment, 13. 
99 Ibid., 11. 
100 Department of Homeland Security, National Infrastructure Protection Plan, 2006, 37. 
101 Congressional Research Service, Risk Management and Critical Infrastructure Protection: 
Assessing, Integrating, and Managing Threats, Vulnerabilities and Consequences (Washington D.C., 
2007), 22. 
102 Department of Homeland Security, National Infrastructure Protection Plan, 2006, 37. 
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economic revenue, lost wages, etc., as those measurements would depend largely upon 
the scale of the event, unknown until an actual incident occurs.  Therefore, assessing 
direct economic impact utilizing property value is the most pragmatic method to 
quantifying the consequences factor in the risk assessment equation.   
The value of court facilities varies drastically throughout the state of California.  
Many court locations are located in mixed-use facilities, usually co-located with county 
offices such as boards of supervisors, probation departments, district attorneys, etc.  
Court-occupied space ranges in size from the very small (500 square feet of area housing 
one courtroom) to the very large (400,000 square feet of area housing over one hundred 
courtrooms).   
The California Administrative Office of the Courts Office of Court Construction 
and Management (OCCM), in consultation with the judicial branch contracted actuary, 
has assigned a direct economic value to existing court space of $250 per square foot.103  
Utilizing this standard unit of measurement, direct economic value of California court 
facilities ranges from $125,000 to $102 million.   
B. HUMAN IMPACT 
Measuring human impact as a result of a terrorist attack is inherently difficult.  
Post-event, multiple factors may be taken into account, including — for survivors — 
medical costs, costs of psychological counseling, and lost wages.  For the deceased, 
lifetime lost wages and burial costs are just two factors to consider.  There are other ways 
an attack upon a courthouse could have a significant human impact.  An attack could 
result in a loss of faith in government institutions (i.e., if the courts can not protect me 
from a terrorist attack, how can I rely upon them to accurately dispense justice?).  An 
attack could result in a decrease in life satisfaction for survivors and community 
members.104 
                                                 
103 James Mullen, Senior Facilities Risk Manager, California Administrative Office of the Courts, 
interview by author, November 2, 2007. 
104 Bruno Frey et al., “Calculating Tragedy: Assessing the Costs of Terrorism,” Journal of Economic 
Surveys 21, no. 1 (2004), 17. 
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For the purposes of pre-event consequence assessment, it is very difficult to 
estimate factors such as medical costs, psychological counseling, etc., without knowing 
the scale of the event.  Quantifying abstract factors, such as loss of faith in government or 
one’s decrease in life satisfaction, is currently impossible.  Academic research is sorely 
lacking in this topic area.   
Assessing the human impact consequences of an attack upon a courthouse, 
however, can be accomplished using straightforward, quantifiable proxies.  For example, 
the Municipal Police Officers’ Education and Training Commission (MPOETC) 
developed a Vulnerability Assessment Worksheet, which includes a human loss of life 
factor in consequence measurement.105  The MPOETC measurement takes into account 
site population capacity at a particular site.  Site population capacity is defined as the 
maximum number of individuals at a site at a given time.106  It is sensible to assume that 
site population capacity would correlate closely to courthouse size.  The larger the 
facility, the more people an incident is likely to impact, and vice versa.  Therefore, it 
would logically stand to reason that the consequence measurement of direct economic 
impact would also reliably measure the human impact of a terrorist attack.  For the 
purposes of this risk assessment tool, the direct economic impact consequence assessment 
will serve also as a proxy measurement for the human impact consequence.   
C. CONSEQUENCE QUANTIFICATION 
Direct economic value in court facilities throughout the state ranges from 
$125,000 to $102 million.  In order to maintain a consistent quantification methodology, 
direct economic value is translated into a points system proportionate with that utilized 
for threats and vulnerabilities.  The following method will be utilized to quantify the 
consequence measurement for direct economic value: 
 
                                                 
105 Municipal Police Officers’ Education and Training Commission, Vulnerability Assessment 




Table 4.   Consequence Quantification Framework. 
Direct Economic Value* Points Direct Economic Value Points 
Below $1M 1 $40M - $50M 6 
$1M - $10M 2 $50M - $60M 7 
$10M - $20M 3 $60M - $70M 8 
$20M - $30M 4 $70M - $80M 9 
$30M - $40M 5 Above $80M107 10 
* Direct economic value equals the number of square feet in a facility times the economic 
value of that space. 
Security planners in other states will need to determine direct economic impact 
values appropriate for their own court facilities, as values will vary from one state to the 
next.   
 
 
                                                 
107 Only one court in the state rates a direct economic value of over $90 million – the Stanley Mosk 
Courthouse in Los Angeles, with over 400,000 square feet and an economic value of $102 million.  
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VI. RISK ASSESSMENT TOOL BETA-TEST 
The complete risk assessment tool developed as a result of this research is located 
in Appendix III.  The tool was beta-tested using data from four courthouses throughout 
the state of California.  Historical threat data was collected by surveying leadership 
personnel from each respective court.  The author collected vulnerability data during 
onsite court visits conducted from 2006 to 2007.  Information on square footage of court 
space, used to calculate consequences, was provided by official data from the AOC’s 
Office of Court Construction and Management.  Because the data collected includes 
information on existing vulnerabilities, the names of the actual courts have not been used.  
Instead, the courts will be referred to as A, B, C, and D.  All court facilities surveyed are 
the primary courts in their respective counties.  All courts are located in primarily rural 
counties, with populations ranging from between 65,000 and 190,000 people.   
A. BETA-TEST RESULTS 
The full risk assessment results are included in Appendix IV.  Summary results 
are reproduced below.  Threats that had not occurred in any of the courts over the 
previous five years, and vulnerabilities that were non-existent in any of the courts, were 
not included in the respective summary results tables. 
Table 5.   Threats in beta-tested courts. 
 
 
Incident/Threat Court A Court B Court C Court D 
Inmate escape  1  4 
Other violence resulting in physical harm to 
judicial officer, court staff, juror, witness, 
litigant, etc. 
1  1 4 
Attempted violence to judicial officer, court 
staff, juror, witness, litigant, etc. 1   3 
Attempted inmate escape    1 
Bomb Threat 5 3 1 3 
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Table 6.   Direct Economic impact in beta-tested courts. 
Vulnerability Court A Court B Court C Court D 
No weapons screening exists   X  
Many exemptions exist to the 
entrance screening policy (i.e., court 
staff, members of the California Bar, 
county employees) 
 X   
No distinct circulation exists (public, 
staff, judges, and inmates mingle)   X X 
No secure holding facilities exist   X  
No access control system is in place 
(i.e., there is no key control system or 
card access system) 
  X  
Sally port (for inmate delivery) is 
unsecured   X  
Some exemptions exist to the 
entrance screening policy (i.e., court 
staff, off duty law enforcement) 
X   X 
No secure parking exists for judges 
and court staff X  X X 
No barrier/partition exists between 
clerks and public  X   
A duress annunciation system exists, 
but reliability is uncertain and/or 
system is not in place in some 
vulnerable areas 
 X   
No ballistic resistant material exists in 
vulnerable windows or wall paneling X X X  
No intrusion alarm system exists X X X  
No CCTV system exists X X X  
Some access controls are in place, but 
application is not comprehensive X X  X 
Some, but not all, of the vulnerable 
windows and wall paneling features 
ballistic resistant material 
   X 
Semi-distinct circulation exists (ex. 
some minimal mixing of staff and 
inmates may occur) 
 X   
Landscaping is partially trimmed but 
some problem areas exist where 
improvised explosive devices could 
be hidden 
X X X X 
Partial clerk’s security windows exist X   X 
Exterior lighting partially, but not 
fully, illuminates exterior of 
courthouse during hours of darkness 
  X X 
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Court A Square 
Footage/Economic 
Impact 
Court B Square 
Footage/Economic 
Impact 
Court C Square 
Footage/Economic 
Impact 
Court D Square 
Footage/Economic 
Impact 
42,000/$11M 19,000/$5M 8,600/$2.15M 35,000/$9M 
 
As illustrated by the tables above, the assessed threat level varied considerably 
among the four courts.  Court C reported only two threats over the five-year period while 
court D reported fifteen threats in the same period.  This represents the greatest variance 
among any of the three factors comprising the risk assessment.   
Court A reported the lowest number of vulnerabilities while Court C reported the 
greatest.  Court A is the most modern of the courts included in the test and is vulnerable 
to the least number of security deficiencies.   Court C is the oldest of the four beta-tested 
courts, having been constructed in 1860.  The facility housing court C is occupied by 
several other county tenants; the court is a minority occupant.  As such, the court has less 
control over the security of the building that the other three courts, each of which is the 
majority occupant in their facility.  The vulnerabilities for Court C are the most 
significant among the four courts.   
Court A is the largest of the four courts and rates highest on the consequence 
scale, as a result.  Court C is the smallest. 
Calculation of raw scores by category 
Calculating the raw score for the threat variable is a two-step process.  First, 
multiply the number of times a threat occurred by the points assigned to that type of 
threat.  Second, sum the values obtained in the first step.  For example, if one inmate has 
escaped, multiply 1 incident x 4 points and add the result to the scores of other 




Calculate the raw score for vulnerabilities by summing the points associated with 
each of the vulnerabilities present for that court.  For example, if no weapons screening 
exists (10 points) and no CCTV system exists (4 points), then add 10 plus 4 to yield 14 
points. 
Consequences are a function of the size of the court.  Obtain the raw 
consequences score by multiplying the number of square feet by the economic value of 
$250 and use the consequences table to determine the point value.  For example, if the 
size is 10,000 square feet, and the value in the table is $2,500,000, the corresponding 
number of points is two. 
Table 7.   Raw risk scores for beta-tested courts. 
Raw Score Valuation 
Court A Court B Court C Court D Maximum 
Threats 17 10 6 38 38 
Vulnerabilities 32 38 58 33 58 
Consequences 3 2 2 2 3 
 
Normalization of risk values 
Within the risk assessment tool, all qualitative threat, vulnerability, and 
consequence information is standardized.  Data within each category is normalized to 
ensure each value falls between the range of 0 and 1 by dividing each factor by a 
common variable.  The common variable used is always the highest value in the data set 
for that variable.   
The dynamic nature of the underlying data requires a simultaneous evaluation 




gathered at the same time.  This precludes evaluation across multiple time periods.  
Consequently, evaluations of courts should be accomplished in close temporal proximity 
to one another. 
Calculation of normalized scores by category 
Following are the raw threat scores for the courts: 17, 10, 6, and 38.  The values 
are normalized by dividing all of them by the highest value, 38.  Normalized threat scores 
fall between .16 and 1.   
The raw vulnerability scores for the four courts are 32, 33, 38, and 58.  The values 
are normalized by dividing all of them by the highest value, 58.  Normalized vulnerability 
scores fall between .55 and 1.   
The raw consequence score for three of the four courts is 2.  One court, Court A, 
has a raw consequence score of 3.  Each score was divided by the highest value, 3.  The 
normalized consequence score for three of the four courts is .67.  The normalized 
consequence score for Court A is 1.   
Table 8.   Normalized threat, vulnerability, and consequence scores for beta-tested 
courts. 
Normalized Score Valuation 
Court A Court B Court C Court D 
Threats 0.45 0.26 0.16 1.00 
Vulnerabilities 0.55 0.66 1.00 0.57 
Consequences 1.00 0.67 0.67 0.67 
 
 
Calculating normalized risk assessment scores 
Calculating a court’s normalized risk assessment score is accomplished by 
multiplying the normalized threat value, the normalized vulnerabilities value, and the  
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normalized consequences value.  The entire product is then multiplied by 100.  For 
example, below is the equation used to calculate the normalized risk assessment score for 
Court A: 
0.45 x 0.55 x 1 x 100 = 25 
Table 9.   Final risk assessment score for beta-tested courts. 
Normalized Risk Assessment Score 
Court A Court B Court C Court D 
T x V x C x 
100 25 11 11 38 
 
Evaluating risk-based upon normalized risk assessment scores 
By rank ordering (i.e., prioritizing) the risk ratings for the four beta-tested courts, 
it is possible to identify which court warrants the most immediate attention.  The highest 
level of risk exists in court D, with a total value of 38.  The court at second highest risk is 
court A, with a total value of 25.  Courts B and C ranked last on the risk scale, each with 
a risk value of 11.   
B. REDUCING IDENTIFIED RISK IN COURT D 
In order to implement protective programs it is necessary to identify 
countermeasures to reduce existing risks. 108  For the purpose of this thesis, risk reduction 
will be focused on the most at-risk court, court D.  
The most common historical threat in court D is “Other violence resulting in 
physical harm to a judicial officer, court staff, juror, witness, litigant, etc.”  Also common 
is “Attempted violence to a judicial officer, court staff, juror, witness, litigant, etc.”  
Other threats faced by the court include “Inmate escape” and “Attempted inmate escape.”  
By looking at the existing vulnerabilities in the courthouse, the most serious 
vulnerability faced by court D is a lack of distinct circulation.  Court D’s courthouse is a 
                                                 
108 Department of Homeland Security, National Infrastructure Protection Plan, 4. 
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registered historic landmark, built in 1917.  Like many historic courthouses, a separate 
circulation pattern for inmates, judicial officers and staff, and members of the public was 
not part of the architectural design.  Judges’ chambers open onto public corridors and 
inmates are escorted to court through public hallways.  While the attending sheriff’s 
deputies undoubtedly do their best to mitigate incidents, it is reasonable to assume that a 
lack of secure circulation is an important factor in the high incidence of attacks in the 
courthouse.  It may also be related to the attempted and successful inmate escapes.   
Court D also has a historical record of susceptibility to bomb threats.  The court 
has had three bomb threats over the past five years.  Although there are no known 
countermeasures to alleviate the likelihood of bomb threats, countermeasures may be 
developed to mitigate the possibility of a successful actual bomb attack.  Looking at 
existing vulnerabilities in the courthouse, there are several that could be addressed to 
lower the court’s vulnerability to a successful bomb attack.  These are reproduced below. 
• No secure parking exists for judges and court staff; 
• Some, but not all, of the vulnerable windows and wall paneling features ballistic-
resistant material; and 
• Landscaping is partially trimmed, but some problem areas exist where improvised 
explosive devices could be hidden. 
The implementation of a secure parking area for judicial officers would mitigate 
the possibility of a bomb being placed under a judge’s vehicle.  Landscaping practices 
(i.e., pruning of hedges) could reduce the likelihood of an explosive device being planted 
adjacent to the courthouse.  Installation of ballistic-resistant material in all of the 
vulnerable windows and wall paneling could help reduce the effects of a bomb blast.  
Implementation of the following countermeasures would reduce risk to court D: 
• Implement separate, secure circulation zones;  
• Provide a secure parking area for judicial officers and court staff; 
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• Ensure all landscaping is manicured to thwart easy placement of an improvised 
explosive device; and 
• Install ballistic-resistant material in all of the vulnerable windows and wall 
paneling. 
If all of the four suggested recommendations to reduce vulnerability for court D 
were implemented and risks were re-assessed relative to courts A, B, and C (assuming 
that nothing changed in courts A, B, or C), the following new risk rating would be 
assigned to the court: 
Table 10.   Revised risk score for Court D. 
Total Risk Assessment: Court D  
 





With vulnerability reduction, court D would no longer be the most at-risk among 
the four courts.  Although its threat and consequence ratings remain unchanged, the 
mitigation of four existing vulnerabilities measurably reduces the risk rating for court D.  
The full risk-assessment tool for court D, re-assessed with notional vulnerability 
reduction, is included in Appendix V. 
Risk-Assessment Tool Beta-Test Summary 
The beta-test of the risk assessment tool illustrates the potential for quantitative 
analysis within a holistic approach to security management for the judiciary.  By 
analyzing the threats and vulnerabilities faced by courts and rank ordering the relative 
risk faced by each facility, resources can be allocated in a more prioritized and 
responsible manner.  Once the risk score for each court is rank ordered and the priorities 
are made evident, more detailed analysis of individual court data is appropriate.  The 
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analysis should focus on the most likely threats to the facility and the existing 
vulnerabilities.  Countermeasure recommendations most likely to reduce the likelihood of 
successful attacks should be developed.  Notional vulnerability reduction and risk re-
assessment are helpful tools to illustrate the effects of vulnerability reduction on overall 
risk in advance of investment.   
C. RISK ASSESSMENTS AND COURT CLUSTERING IN CALIFORNIA 
Purely accounting for economic impact, large courthouses will always score 
higher on the consequence scale than small, one-courtroom-type facilities.  This will 
routinely result in a greater overall risk assessment score for larger facilities than for 
smaller.  It is neither politically feasible, nor sensible from the perspective of security, to 
concentrate all resources on large facilities.  A solution to the wide disparity in direct 
economic value is to address risk assessment in a somewhat more refined manner.  For 
example, the California courts are divided into four “court clusters” based upon the 
county in which they are located.  Courts are assigned to clusters based upon a rather 
complex formula accounting for the following factors: county population size, annual 
number of case filings, and number of assigned judicial officers.109  Court cluster one 
comprises the smallest courts in the state, while court cluster four represents the largest.   
In order to allow for resource provision to courts throughout the state, rather than 
just the largest facilities, risk assessment rankings can be broken up into the four pre-
existing court clusters.  Cluster one courts will only contend for resources, based upon 
their risk-assessed ranking, with other cluster one courts.  This will ensure that a two-
courtroom facility in San Benito County will not be forced to “compete” for resources 
with a seventy-courtroom facility in San Diego County.  For the purposes of this thesis, 
all beta-tested courts belong to court cluster two. 
 
                                                 
109 Marcia Caballin, Finance Division Assistant Director, California Administrative Office of the 
Courts, interview by author, January 18, 2007.  
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VII. CONCLUSION 
A.  SUMMARY 
The purpose of this thesis was to encourage a risk-based approach to court 
security and develop a risk assessment tool to evaluate relative risk across a range of 
judicial facilities.  The risk assessment tool was developed by determining the most 
prevalent threats to the judiciary, the most common existing vulnerabilities in court 
facilities, and the consequence of direct economic impact on court facilities.  The most 
prevalent threats were determined by aggregating incident data from state courts across 
the nation.  Vulnerabilities were determined based upon security survey data from the 
California Administrative Office of the Courts Emergency Response and Security unit 
and guidance from the National Sheriff’s Association, the National Center for State 
Courts, and court security experts from the Annals of the American Academy of Political 
and Social Science.  Quantification of threat and vulnerability data was achieved by 
surveying court security specialists throughout the state of California.  Values from the 
California Administrative Office of the Courts Office of Court Construction and 
Management were used to measure direct economic impact — the consequences portion 
of the risk assessment tool.    
Once the tool was developed, four courts were surveyed as a beta-test.  The goal 
of the beta-test was to evaluate the tool’s utility in determining relative risk across a small 
subset of facilities.  All courts were surveyed to determine the following information: 
• Type and frequency of threats occurring over the previous five years 
• Existing vulnerabilities  
• Square footage of court occupied space 
The data was applied to the risk-assessment formula, quantified, and normalized 
across the four beta-tested courts.  A numeric risk-assessment score was determined for 
each of the courts.  Relative risk was determined by comparing the four numeric values.  
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Threats and vulnerabilities for the court with the highest risk rating, Court D, were 
analyzed in depth, in an effort to determine countermeasures appropriate to reducing risk.  
Following the discussion of countermeasures, the tool was re-applied to Court D, with the 
goal of evaluating the effect of the recommendations on risk reduction.  Once applied, the 
risk score for the most at-risk court dropped below that of the next most at-risk court.   
B. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
AND DEVELOPMENT 
The decision support tool developed in this thesis represents the initial deliverable 
in the effort to evaluate court security utilizing a risk-based approach.  The beta-test 
validated the tool as a useful mechanism for calculating and rank-ordering risk across a 
range of court facilities.   
Many lessons were learned during this research effort.  Most importantly, the risk-
assessment tool is a useful mechanism for evaluating and comparing relative risk for the 
judiciary.  It also aids in assessing changes in relative risk following planned investment.  
A meaningful byproduct of the research effort is the understanding that much more work 
needs to be done to identify threats to the judiciary.   
Threats 
During the information-gathering stage of the research effort, it was clear that 
historical threat data is not universally gathered by individual courts.  Only one of the 
four beta-tested courts had detailed records of the threats experienced by the court over 
the past five years.  None of the other three courts had a written log of security incidents.  
Instead, incidents were recalled by staff members who had worked at the court for several 
years.  The risk-assessment tool is only effective when populated with valid data.  A 
court that does not have a record of the threats it has faced over the past five years may 
under- or over-report threats during the data-gathering stage.   
One development effort that should begin immediately, as a result of this thesis, is 
a mechanism to collect threat incident data from courts throughout the state of California.   
Other state judiciaries that also lack comprehensive threat and incident reporting systems 
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should also consider enacting procedures for capturing threat information.  A 
comprehensive educational effort to instruct court leaders and security personnel as to 
what constitutes a threat, and how to report it, should necessarily accompany the 
implementation of such a system. 
Threats are assessed in this risk model by examining historical threat data (i.e., 
what incidents have occurred in each court within the past five years).  Not identified 
using this model, in the manifest interest of keeping the tool user friendly, are other threat 
factors that may help a security planner develop a more comprehensive threat picture.  
Future iterations of this tool may take into account additional threat information, such as 
type (e.g., insider, terrorist, random), intent or motivation, triggers (e.g., events that might 
precede an attack, such as the scheduling of a high-profile trial at a specific court 
facility), capability (e.g., skills, access to materials or equipment), and most likely 
methods (e.g., use of truck bombs, pipe bombs, small arms fire).110   
Vulnerabilities 
The identification of vulnerabilities in the courts is a more self evident process 
than the identification of historical threats.  Vulnerabilities either exist or they do not.  
Assuming accurate reporting, the vulnerabilities section of the risk assessment tool does 
not suffer from a potential reliability gap.  This held true during the application phase of 
the beta-test discussed in this thesis.   
Future iterations of the tool, as planners become more adept at risk-based security 
management, may include additional factors, beyond those strictly related to physical 
security.  Additional factors that could increase a court’s vulnerability to attack may 
include the types of cases heard in a court (i.e., criminal court vs. traffic court), the 
location of the court (i.e., in an easily recognizable iconic court facility, as opposed to a 
nondescript storefront type of facility), and the nature of the community served by the 
court (i.e., a court located on the central front in a gang-warfare zone may be at a greater 
risk of attack than a court in a small, generally law-abiding community). 
                                                 
110 Congressional Research Service, Risk Management and Critical Infrastructure Protection: 
Assessing, Integrating, and Managing Threats, Vulnerabilities and Consequences, 7. 
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Consequences 
The Consequences component of the risk-assessment tool, as developed in this 
thesis, is straightforward.  Like the vulnerabilities factor, consequences are relatively easy 
to measure, as long as square footage of the court space is known.  However, there are 
areas that would benefit from further exploration.  One such area is the impact on public 
confidence in the government following an attack.  The body of literature researched for 
this thesis did not reveal methods for quantifying lack of public confidence following an 
attack.  The mission of the judiciary is to provide fair and accessible justice to all.  If a 
courthouse is attacked and citizens are placed at risk, how can we determine the potential 
short-term and long-term psychological effects of that attack?  How would faith in 
government’s ability to protect the public degrade following an attack of this nature?  
Would the psychological effects be more pronounced if the attack were on a major urban 
court that serves hundreds of thousands of residents, or in a small court environment, 
where the courthouse has historically served as a focal point of the county?  Future 
research must be developed to assess the psychological impact of terrorist attacks on 
government and how to quantify those effects for inclusion in the risk-assessment tool.   
Another area that is likely to suffer after an attack is the government’s ability to 
deliver minimum essential public services.  The body of literature researched for this 
thesis, however, did not reveal methods for quantifying loss of government capability 
following an attack.  Therefore, research need be accomplished to measure this 
consequence factor.   
Future research should also explore risk management and the judiciary in relation 
to offsite locations.  Threats to judicial officers, court staff, and witnesses are not 
confined to courthouses.  Sadly, violence can make its way into the private lives of those 
who serve justice.  Continued efforts to protect those who serve the judiciary, outside of 
the courthouse setting, should be the focus of future research on this topic. 
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C. APPLICATION OF THE RISK-ASSESSMENT TOOL 
The risk-assessment tool will help courts and security planners identify existing 
vulnerabilities with a nod toward alleviating those vulnerabilities.  The tool, when 
broadly applied across courts throughout a state, will function as an integral part of a 
decision support system to help security managers identify pervasive security issues.  
Once global issues are identified, security planners can use the tool to help them as they 
work within the state court budget process to evaluate the utility of specific strategies and 
expenditures in reducing risk in courts.  For instance, if a summary assessment of courts 
identifies the fact that intrusion alarm systems are not installed in most courts, an effort to 
procure a statewide contract for intrusion alarms may result.  A statewide funding request 
may also be submitted to address the issue in a comprehensive manner.  Data from the 
risk-assessment tool will be applicable throughout the process of identifying need, 
proposing countermeasures, and requesting state funding to reduce risk.  Included in the 
process should be a measured effort to forecast for future security expenditures, based 
upon information gathered in the risk assessment process.   
To achieve a global risk picture, the tool should be applied to all existing state 
court facilities.  In California, this ambitious effort should be accomplished one court 
cluster at a time, starting from the smallest courts in cluster one and ending with the 
largest courts in cluster four.  This gradual approach will make a formidable task more 
practicable.  It will also allow for cluster-by-cluster analysis of the most pressing 
vulnerabilities to be addressed in the state courts.  Security planners in other state 
judiciaries should determine practical strategies to apply the tool over all state court 
facilities.   
Consistent with the NIPP’s Risk Management Framework, trends identified by 
the statewide survey should be used to implement protective programs.  To do this, 
statewide initiatives should be undertaken to request funding for security programs that 
are found to be particularly deficient in courts throughout the state, as identified by the 
survey.  In California, this request should be similar to the successful request, in 2005, to 
provide funding for entrance screening for courts lacking such equipment. 
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Other funding earmarked for court security should be focused on improving the 
components deemed most deficient by the survey.  When possible, statewide contracts 
should be procured to ensure a standard of quality and cost controls for necessary 
components and services. 
Finally, consistent with the NIPP Risk Management Framework, the risk 
assessment tool should be regularly re-applied to state court systems in an effort to 
measure effectiveness.  Courts, particularly those most at risk, should be re-evaluated on 
a biennial basis.  Facilities should be ranked in order of deficiency severity.  Chronically 
at-risk courts should be placed at the top of the priority list for funding for facility 
upgrades.   
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APPENDIX I: THREAT QUANTIFICATION SURVEY 
The survey to determine the points allocated to threats was sent to the California Court 
Security Network Listserve.  The California Court Security Network listserve is a forum 
for court security professionals and staff liaisons to discuss issues and best practices 
relating to court security.  The makeup of the listserve is evenly split between court 
security professionals (generally, the court’s most senior member of the county Sheriff’s 
Court Security division) and court leadership overseeing court security issues within the 
court. There are approximately ninety active members of the Security Network Listserve.   
The survey consisted of the following request: 
 
Hello Security Network,  
  
In an effort to develop a risk assessment framework for court security, I’m working on 
evaluating the various types of threats courts are exposed to.  I’ve used data accumulated 
over the last ten years, as compiled by Paul Banner from the Public Agency Training 
Council, to identify the most common threats courts are exposed to.  Now, I’d like your 
assistance and expertise in rank ordering the severity of those threats from what you 
consider to be most severe to least severe.111    
 
Your response to this survey will help enable me to assign appropriately ranked points to 
each threat, as part of the framework.  If you have a couple of minutes to assist me by 
applying your expertise to this endeavor, I would appreciate it.   
  
If you have the time, please assign a ranking from 1-5 for each of the ten incidents below, 
1 being the least severe and 5 being the most severe.  Once completed, please send to me 
at sara.fisher@jud.ca.gov (please do not respond to the entire list).   
  
                                                 
111 Severity, for the purposes of this survey, should be understood to mean “most destructive for court 
operations, loss of life, loss of faith in the judiciary, etc.” 
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Least Severe                           Moderately Severe                            Most Severe 




Explosive device/bomb in or on 
courthouse property   
Shooting in the 
courthouse/courtroom   
Hostage situation   
Inmate escape   
Other violence resulting in 
physical harm to judicial officer, 
court staff, juror, witness, 
litigant, etc. 
  
Bomb threat   
Attempted shooting in 
courthouse/courtroom   
Attempted hostage situation   
Attempted inmate escape   
Attempted violence to judicial 
officer, court staff, juror, 
witness, litigant, etc. 
  
 



























Mean 4.46 4.63 4.38 3.54 4.13 2.42 4.33 3.42 3.17 3.38 
Standard Error 0.18 0.19 0.17 0.20 0.23 0.22 0.18 0.21 0.26 0.25 
Median 5 5 5 4 5 3 5 4 4 4 
Mode 5 5 5 4 5 3 5 4 4 4 
Standard Deviation 0.88 0.92 0.82 0.98 1.12 1.10 0.87 1.02 1.27 1.21 
Sample Variance 0.78 0.85 0.68 0.95 1.24 1.21 0.75 1.04 1.62 1.46 
Minimum 2 2 3 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 
Maximum 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 
Count 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 
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Average point values from the survey form the basis for assigning point values for 
each incident.  
 
Incident 
# of incidents 
occurring within 
last five years 
Point value 
per incident 
# of incidents x 
point value per 
incident 
Explosive device/bomb in or on 
courthouse property  5  
Shooting in the 
courthouse/courtroom  5  
Hostage situation  4  
Inmate escape  4  
Other violence resulting in 
physical harm to judicial officer, 
court staff, juror, witness, 
litigant, etc. 
 4  
Attempted shooting in 
courthouse/courtroom   4  
Attempted violence to judicial 
officer, court staff, juror, 
witness, litigant, etc. 
 3  
Attempted hostage situation  3  
Attempted inmate escape  3  







APPENDIX II: VULNERABILITY QUANTIFICATION SURVEY 
The survey to determine the points allocated to vulnerabilities was sent to a small 
group of senior court security leaders and security coordinators from the Emergency 
Response and Security unit within the California Administrative Office of the Courts.  
Ranking officers from the following counties provided feedback leading to the 
development of the vulnerability point allocation: Riverside, Sacramento, Santa Barbara, 
and Yolo County.   
 
The survey consisted of the following request: 
Thank you all for responding to my last survey regarding threats to the courts.   
I'm sending this to a limited number of senior leaders in the California Court Security 
field, in an effort to get your expert feedback on the second piece of the risk assessment 
framework for court security — vulnerabilities. 
Now that we have a sense of the relative importance of the various threats to the 
courts in California, it’s necessary to develop a relative ranking for the primary 
vulnerabilities which exist in courthouses across the state.  The list of vulnerabilities on 
the attached is by no means representative of all of the vulnerabilities faced in our courts.  
It should include the major vulnerabilities, however.  The ranking for vulnerabilities is 
from 1-10.  The higher the number, the more serious the vulnerability.  I'm seeking your 
assistance in ranking the vulnerabilities in order of importance/seriousness, based upon 
your experience in the courts.  It may be somewhat difficult to assess which vulnerability 
poses the greater severity.  I’m looking for your expert opinion.  For example, I 
personally believe that a vulnerability which would allow a bomb to be easily planted 
adjacent to a courthouse is more serious than a vulnerability which would make a clerk 
vulnerable to attack from an irate customer.  Therefore, in my own ranking, I assigned a 
higher point value to landscaping overgrowth than I did to a lack of barrier between the 
clerks and the public.  It is that type of “gut feeling” assessment I’m seeking from you.   
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Please let me know if you have any questions.  Thank you for your participation 
in this survey.   
 
Vulnerability Relative Points Value 
No weapons screening exists  
Many exemptions exist to the entrance screening policy 
(i.e., court staff, members of the California Bar, county 
employees) 
 
No distinct circulation exists (public, staff, judges, and 
inmates mingle)  
Partial weapons screening only (i.e., screening part time 
or only with hand wands)  
No secure holding facilities exist  
No access control system is in place (i.e., there is no key 
control system or card access system)  
Sally port (for inmate delivery) is unsecured  
No duress annunciation system is in place  
Some exemptions exist to the entrance screening policy 
(i.e., court staff, off duty law enforcement)  
No secure parking exists for judges and court staff  
No barrier/partition exists between clerks and public  
Exterior lighting is greatly lacking or nonexistent  
Landscaping near facility is overgrown and affords 
opportunity to hide improvised explosive devices  
A duress annunciation system exists, but reliability is 
uncertain and/or system is not in place in some 
vulnerable areas 
 
No ballistic resistant material exists in vulnerable 
windows or wall paneling  
No intrusion alarm system exists  
No CCTV system exists  
Partially controlled parking areas exist for judges and 
court staff (i.e., drop arm barrier)  
Some access controls are in place, but application is not 
comprehensive  
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Some, but not all, of the vulnerable windows and wall 
paneling features ballistic resistant material  
Semi-distinct circulation exists (ex. some minimal 
mixing of staff and inmates may occur)  
A CCTV system is in place which is intermittently 
monitored and/or not comprehensive throughout the 
courthouse 
 
Landscaping is partially trimmed but some problem 
areas exist where improvised explosive devices could be 
hidden 
 
The sally port is moderately, but not fully, secured  
Partial clerk’s security windows exist  
Exterior lighting partially, but not fully, illuminates 
exterior of courthouse during hours of darkness  
 
Data on vulnerability quantification was solicited from seven court security 
experts.  The results appear in the next table. 
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Vulnerability Quantification Survey: Descriptive statistics. 
 
Vulnerability  Mean 
Standard 




Variance Min. Max. Count 
No weapons screening exists 10.00 0.00 10 10 0.00 0.00 10 10 7 
Many exemptions exist to the entrance 
screening policy (i.e., court staff, 
members of the California Bar, county 
employees) 
7.14 0.34 7 7 0.90 0.81 6 9 7 
No distinct circulation exists (public, 
staff, judges, and inmates mingle)  7.00 0.38 7 7 1.00 1.00 6 9 7 
No access control system is in place 
(i.e., there is no key control system in 
place, a card access system is not 
used) 
6.14 0.40 6 6 1.07 1.14 4 7 7 
No secure holding facilities exist 7.14 0.34 7 8 0.90 0.81 6 8 7 
No duress annunciation system is in 
place 6.00 0.49 6 6 1.29 1.67 4 8 7 
Partial weapons screening (i.e., 
screening part time or only with hand 
wands) 
6.86 0.63 7 5 1.68 2.81 5 9 7 
No secure parking exists for judges 
and court staff 5.14 0.40 5 5 1.07 1.14 4 7 7 
No ballistic resistant material exists in 
vulnerable windows or wall paneling 4.43 0.57 4 4 1.51 2.29 2 7 7 
Landscaping near facility is 
overgrown and affords opportunity to 
hide improvised explosive devices 
5.00 0.31 5 5 0.82 0.67 4 6 7 
Sally port is unsecured 5.86 0.51 6 7 1.35 1.81 4 7 7 
Some exemptions exist to the entrance 
screening policy (i.e., court staff, off 4.71 0.52 4 4 1.38 1.90 3 7 7 
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duty law enforcement) 
No barrier/partition exists between 
clerks and public  4.86 0.26 5 5 0.69 0.48 4 6 7 
No intrusion alarm system exists 4.29 0.42 5 5 1.11 1.24 2 5 7 
No CCTV system exists 4.14 0.55 5 5 1.46 2.14 2 6 7 
Exterior lighting is greatly lacking or 
nonexistent 4.57 0.48 5 3 1.27 1.62 3 6 7 
Some access controls are in place, but 
application is not comprehensive 3.86 0.46 3 3 1.21 1.48 3 6 7 
Some, but not all, of the vulnerable 
windows and wall paneling features 
ballistic resistant material 
3.86 0.40 4 3 1.07 1.14 3 6 7 
Semi-distinct circulation exists (ex. 
some minimal mixing of staff and 
inmates may occur) 
4.00 0.65 3 3 1.73 3.00 3 7 7 
A duress annunciation system exists, 
but reliability is uncertain and/or 
system is not in place in some 
vulnerable areas 
4.57 0.43 4 4 1.13 1.29 3 6 7 
A CCTV system is in place which is 
intermittently monitored and/or not 
comprehensive throughout the 
courthouse 
3.57 0.48 4 2 1.27 1.62 2 5 7 
Landscaping is partially trimmed but 
some problem areas exist where 
improvised explosive devices could 
be hidden 
2.86 0.46 2 2 1.21 1.48 2 5 7 
Partially controlled parking areas exist 
for judges and court staff (i.e., drop 
arm barrier) 
3.57 0.65 3 2 1.72 2.95 2 6 7 
The sally port is moderately, but not 
fully, secured 2.71 0.57 3 1 1.50 2.24 1 5 7 
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Partial clerk’s security windows exist 2.86 0.67 4 1 1.77 3.14 1 5 7 
Exterior lighting partially, but not 
fully, illuminates exterior of 
courthouse during hours of darkness 





Average point values from the survey form the basis for assigning point values for each 
vulnerability. 
 
Vulnerability Relative Points Value Total Points 
No weapons screening exists 10  
Many exemptions exist to the entrance 
screening policy (i.e., court staff, members of 
the California Bar, county employees) 
7  
No distinct circulation exists (public, staff, 
judges, and inmates mingle) 7  
Partial weapons screening only (i.e., 
screening part time or only with hand wands) 7  
No secure holding facilities exist 7  
No access control system is in place (i.e., 
there is no key control system or card access 
system) 
6  
Sally port (for inmate delivery) is unsecured 6  
No duress annunciation system is in place 6  
Some exemptions exist to the entrance 
screening policy (i.e., court staff, off duty law 
enforcement) 
5  
No secure parking exists for judges and court 
staff 5  
No barrier/partition exists between clerks and 
public 5  
Exterior lighting is greatly lacking or 
nonexistent 5  
Landscaping near facility is overgrown and 
affords opportunity to hide improvised 
explosive devices 
5  
A duress annunciation system exists, but 
reliability is uncertain and/or system is not in 
place in some vulnerable areas 
5  
No ballistic resistant material exists in 
vulnerable windows or wall paneling 4  
No intrusion alarm system exists 4  
No CCTV system exists 4  
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Partially controlled parking areas exist for 
judges and court staff (i.e., drop arm barrier) 4  
Some access controls are in place, but 
application is not comprehensive 4  
Some, but not all, of the vulnerable windows 
and wall paneling features ballistic resistant 
material 
4  
Semi-distinct circulation exists (ex. some 
minimal mixing of staff and inmates may 
occur) 
4  
A CCTV system is in place which is 
intermittently monitored and/or not 
comprehensive throughout the courthouse 
4  
Landscaping is partially trimmed but some 
problem areas exist where improvised 
explosive devices could be hidden 
3  
The sally port is moderately, but not fully, 
secured 3  
Partial clerk’s security windows exist 3  
Exterior lighting partially, but not fully, 
illuminates exterior of courthouse during 







APPENDIX III: COMPLETE RISK ASSESSMENT TOOL 
Instructions on how to calculate scores using the risk assessment tool: 
 
Calculating the raw score for the threat variable is a two-step process.  First, multiply the 
number of times a threat occurred by the points assigned to that type of threat.  Second, 
sum the values obtained in the first step.  For example, if one inmate has escaped (worth 
four points on the threat table), multiply 1 incident x 4 points and add the result to the 
scores of other incident/threats for that court. 
Calculate the raw score for vulnerabilities by summing the points associated with each of 
the vulnerabilities present for that court.  For example, if no weapons screening exists (10 
points) and no CCTV system exists (4 points), add 10 plus 4 to yield 14 points. 
Consequences are a function of the size of the court.  Obtain the raw consequences score 
by multiplying the number of square feet by the economic value of $250 and use the 
consequences table to determine the point value.  For example, if the size is 10,000 
square feet, the value in the table is $2,500,000 and the corresponding number of points is 
two. 
Calculating a court’s normalized risk assessment score is accomplished by multiplying 
the normalized threat value, the normalized vulnerabilities value, and the normalized 
consequences value.  The entire product is then multiplied by 100.  For example, below is 
a sample equation: 















Point value per 
incident 
# of incidents x point 
value per incident 
Explosive device/bomb in or on 
courthouse property  5  
Shooting in the 
courthouse/courtroom  5  
Hostage situation  4  
Inmate escape  4  
Other violence resulting in 
physical harm to judicial officer, 
court staff, juror, witness, 
litigant, etc. 
 4  
Attempted shooting in 
courthouse/courtroom  4  
Attempted violence to judicial 
officer, court staff, juror, 
witness, litigant, etc. 
 3  
Attempted hostage situation  3  
Attempted inmate escape  3  
Bomb Threat  2  
Total Threats 






Vulnerability Relative Points Value Total Points 
No weapons screening exists 10  
Many exemptions exist to the entrance 
screening policy (i.e., court staff, members of 
the California Bar, county employees) 
7  
No distinct circulation exists (public, staff, 
judges, and inmates mingle) 7  
Partial weapons screening only (i.e., 
screening part time or only with hand wands) 7  
No secure holding facilities exist 7  
No access control system is in place (i.e., 
there is no key control system or card access 
system) 
6  
Sally port (for inmate delivery) is unsecured 6  
No duress annunciation system is in place 6  
Some exemptions exist to the entrance 
screening policy (i.e., court staff, off duty law 
enforcement) 
5  
No secure parking exists for judges and court 
staff 5  
No barrier/partition exists between clerks and 
public 5  
Exterior lighting is greatly lacking or 
nonexistent 5  
Landscaping near facility is overgrown and 
affords opportunity to hide improvised 
explosive devices 
5  
A duress annunciation system exists, but 
reliability is uncertain and/or system is not in 
place in some vulnerable areas 
5  
No ballistic resistant material exists in 
vulnerable windows or wall paneling 4  
No intrusion alarm system exists 4  
No CCTV system exists 4  
Partially controlled parking areas exist for 
judges and court staff (i.e., drop arm barrier) 4  
Some access controls are in place, but 
application is not comprehensive 4  
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Some, but not all, of the vulnerable windows 
and wall paneling features ballistic resistant 
material 
4  
Semi-distinct circulation exists (ex. some 
minimal mixing of staff and inmates may 
occur) 
4  
A CCTV system is in place which is 
intermittently monitored and/or not 
comprehensive throughout the courthouse 
4  
Landscaping is partially trimmed but some 
problem areas exist where improvised 
explosive devices could be hidden 
3  
The sally port is moderately, but not fully, 
secured 3  
Partial clerk’s security windows exist 3  
Exterior lighting partially, but not fully, 
illuminates exterior of courthouse during 














Direct Economic Value* Points Direct Economic Value Points 
Below $1M 1 $40M - $50M 6 
$1M - $10M 2 $50M - $60M 7 
$10M - $20M 3 $60M - $70M 8 
$20M - $30M 4 $70M - $80M 9 







Total Risk Assessment 
 
Threats _______ x Vulnerabilities_________ x 








Court Cluster (1, 2, 3, 4): ______ 
 
 
Square footage of court space Direct Economic Value of Court Facility (square footage x $250) Points 
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APPENDIX IV: RISK ASSESSMENT TOOL BETA-TEST RESULTS 
This appendix contains the data collected to evaluate the threats, vulnerabilities, and 










Point value per 
incident 
# of incidents x point 
value per incident 
Explosive device/bomb in or on 
courthouse property  5  
Shooting in the 
courthouse/courtroom  5  
Hostage situation  4  
Inmate escape  4  
Other violence resulting in 
physical harm to judicial officer, 
court staff, juror, witness, 
litigant, etc. 
1 4 4 
Attempted shooting in 
courthouse/courtroom  4  
Attempted violence to judicial 
officer, court staff, juror, 
witness, litigant, etc. 
1 3 3 
Attempted hostage situation  3  
Attempted inmate escape  3  
Bomb Threat 5 2 10 
Total Threats 




Court A: Vulnerabilities 
 
Vulnerability Relative Points Value Total Points 
No weapons screening exists 10  
Many exemptions exist to the entrance 
screening policy (i.e., court staff, members of 
the California Bar, county employees) 
7  
No distinct circulation exists (public, staff, 
judges, and inmates mingle) 7  
Partial weapons screening only (i.e., 
screening part time or only with hand wands) 7  
No secure holding facilities exist 7  
No access control system is in place (i.e., 
there is no key control system or card access 
system) 
6  
Sally port (for inmate delivery) is unsecured 6  
No duress annunciation system is in place 6  
Some exemptions exist to the entrance 
screening policy (i.e., court staff, off duty law 
enforcement) 
5 5 
No secure parking exists for judges and court 
staff 5 5 
No barrier/partition exists between clerks and 
public 5  
Exterior lighting is greatly lacking or 
nonexistent 5  
Landscaping near facility is overgrown and 
affords opportunity to hide improvised 
explosive devices 
5  
A duress annunciation system exists, but 
reliability is uncertain and/or system is not in 
place in some vulnerable areas 
5  
No ballistic resistant material exists in 
vulnerable windows or wall paneling 4 4 
No intrusion alarm system exists 4 4 
No CCTV system exists 4 4 
Partially controlled parking areas exist for 
judges and court staff (i.e., drop arm barrier) 4  
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Some access controls are in place, but 
application is not comprehensive 4 4 
Some, but not all, of the vulnerable windows 
and wall paneling features ballistic resistant 
material 
4  
Semi-distinct circulation exists (ex. some 
minimal mixing of staff and inmates may 
occur) 
4  
A CCTV system is in place which is 
intermittently monitored and/or not 
comprehensive throughout the courthouse 
4  
Landscaping is partially trimmed but some 
problem areas exist where improvised 
explosive devices could be hidden 
3 3 
The sally port is moderately, but not fully, 
secured 3  
Partial clerk’s security windows exist 3 3 
Exterior lighting partially, but not fully, 
illuminates exterior of courthouse during 

























Court A: Consequences 
 
Direct Economic Value* Points Direct Economic Value Points 
Below $1M 1 $40M - $50M 6 
$1M - $10M 2 $50M - $60M 7 
$10M - $20M 3 $60M - $70M 8 
$20M - $30M 4 $70M - $80M 9 












Square footage of court space Direct Economic Value of Court Facility (square footage x $250) Points 
42,000 $11M 3 
Normalized Consequences Rating 1 
Total Risk Assessment: Court A 
 















Point value per 
incident 
# of incidents x point 
value per incident 
Explosive device/bomb in or on 
courthouse property  5  
Shooting in the 
courthouse/courtroom  5  
Hostage situation  4  
Inmate escape 1 4 4 
Other violence resulting in 
physical harm to judicial officer, 
court staff, juror, witness, 
litigant, etc. 
 4  
Attempted shooting in 
courthouse/courtroom  4  
Attempted violence to judicial 
officer, court staff, juror, 
witness, litigant, etc. 
 3  
Attempted hostage situation  3  
Attempted inmate escape  3  
Bomb Threat 3 2 6 
Total Threats 




Court B: Vulnerabilities 
 
Vulnerability Relative Points Value Total Points 
No weapons screening exists 10  
Many exemptions exist to the entrance 
screening policy (i.e., court staff, members of 
the California Bar, county employees) 
7 7 
No distinct circulation exists (public, staff, 
judges, and inmates mingle) 7  
Partial weapons screening only (i.e., 
screening part time or only with hand wands) 7  
No secure holding facilities exist 7  
No access control system is in place (i.e., 
there is no key control system or card access 
system) 
6  
Sally port (for inmate delivery) is unsecured 6  
No duress annunciation system is in place 6  
Some exemptions exist to the entrance 
screening policy (i.e., court staff, off duty law 
enforcement) 
5  
No secure parking exists for judges and court 
staff 5  
No barrier/partition exists between clerks and 
public 5 5 
Exterior lighting is greatly lacking or 
nonexistent 5  
Landscaping near facility is overgrown and 
affords opportunity to hide improvised 
explosive devices 
5  
A duress annunciation system exists, but 
reliability is uncertain and/or system is not in 
place in some vulnerable areas 
5 3 
No ballistic resistant material exists in 
vulnerable windows or wall paneling 4 4 
No intrusion alarm system exists 4 4 
No CCTV system exists 4 4 
Partially controlled parking areas exist for 
judges and court staff (i.e., drop arm barrier) 4  
Some access controls are in place, but 
application is not comprehensive 4 4 
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Some, but not all, of the vulnerable windows 
and wall paneling features ballistic resistant 
material 
4  
Semi-distinct circulation exists (ex. some 
minimal mixing of staff and inmates may 
occur) 
4 4 
A CCTV system is in place which is 
intermittently monitored and/or not 
comprehensive throughout the courthouse 
4  
Landscaping is partially trimmed but some 
problem areas exist where improvised 
explosive devices could be hidden 
3 3 
The sally port is moderately, but not fully, 
secured 3  
Partial clerk’s security windows exist 3  
Exterior lighting partially, but not fully, 
illuminates exterior of courthouse during 

























Court B: Consequences 
 
Direct Economic Value* Points Direct Economic Value Points 
Below $1M 1 $40M - $50M 6 
$1M - $10M 2 $50M - $60M 7 
$10M - $20M 3 $60M - $70M 8 
$20M - $30M 4 $70M - $80M 9 
















Square footage of court space Direct Economic Value of Court Facility (square footage x $250) Points 
19,000 $5M 2 
Normalized Consequences Rating .67 
Total Risk Assessment: Court B 
 















Point value per 
incident 
# of incidents x point 
value per incident 
Explosive device/bomb in or on 
courthouse property  5  
Shooting in the 
courthouse/courtroom  5  
Hostage situation  4  
Inmate escape  4  
Other violence resulting in 
physical harm to judicial officer, 
court staff, juror, witness, 
litigant, etc. 
1 4 4 
Attempted shooting in 
courthouse/courtroom  4  
Attempted violence to judicial 
officer, court staff, juror, 
witness, litigant, etc. 
 3  
Attempted hostage situation  3  
Attempted inmate escape  3  
Bomb Threat 1 2 2 
Total Threats 




Court C: Vulnerabilities 
 
Vulnerability Relative Points Value Total Points 
No weapons screening exists 10 10 
Many exemptions exist to the entrance 
screening policy (i.e., court staff, members of 
the California Bar, county employees) 
7  
No distinct circulation exists (public, staff, 
judges, and inmates mingle) 7 7 
Partial weapons screening only (i.e., 
screening part time or only with hand wands) 7  
No secure holding facilities exist 7 7 
No access control system is in place (i.e., 
there is no key control system or card access 
system) 
6 6 
Sally port (for inmate delivery) is unsecured 6 6 
No duress annunciation system is in place 6  
Some exemptions exist to the entrance 
screening policy (i.e., court staff, off duty law 
enforcement) 
5  
No secure parking exists for judges and court 
staff 5 5 
No barrier/partition exists between clerks and 
public 5  
Exterior lighting is greatly lacking or 
nonexistent 5  
Landscaping near facility is overgrown and 
affords opportunity to hide improvised 
explosive devices 
5  
A duress annunciation system exists, but 
reliability is uncertain and/or system is not in 
place in some vulnerable areas 
5  
No ballistic resistant material exists in 
vulnerable windows or wall paneling 4 4 
No intrusion alarm system exists 4 4 
No CCTV system exists 4 4 
Partially controlled parking areas exist for 
judges and court staff (i.e., drop arm barrier) 4  
Some access controls are in place, but 
application is not comprehensive 4  
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Some, but not all, of the vulnerable windows 
and wall paneling features ballistic resistant 
material 
4  
Semi-distinct circulation exists (ex. some 
minimal mixing of staff and inmates may 
occur) 
4  
A CCTV system is in place which is 
intermittently monitored and/or not 
comprehensive throughout the courthouse 
4  
Landscaping is partially trimmed but some 
problem areas exist where improvised 
explosive devices could be hidden 
3 3 
The sally port is moderately, but not fully, 
secured 3  
Partial clerk’s security windows exist 3  
Exterior lighting partially, but not fully, 
illuminates exterior of courthouse during 



























Court C: Consequences 
 
Direct Economic Value* Points Direct Economic Value Points 
Below $1M 1 $40M - $50M 6 
$1M - $10M 2 $50M - $60M 7 
$10M - $20M 3 $60M - $70M 8 
$20M - $30M 4 $70M - $80M 9 













Square footage of court space Direct Economic Value of Court Facility (square footage x $250) Points 
8,600 $2.15M 2 
Normalized Consequences Rating .67 
Total Risk Assessment: Court C 
 















Point value per 
incident 
# of incidents x point 
value per incident 
Explosive device/bomb in or on 
courthouse property  5  
Shooting in the 
courthouse/courtroom  5  
Hostage situation  4  
Inmate escape 1 4 4 
Other violence resulting in 
physical harm to judicial officer, 
court staff, juror, witness, 
litigant, etc. 
4 4 16 
Attempted shooting in 
courthouse/courtroom  4  
Attempted violence to judicial 
officer, court staff, juror, 
witness, litigant, etc. 
3 3 9 
Attempted hostage situation  3  
Attempted inmate escape 1 3 3 
Bomb Threat 3 2 6 
Total Threats 




Court D: Vulnerabilities 
 
Vulnerability Relative Points Value Total Points 
No weapons screening exists 10  
Many exemptions exist to the entrance 
screening policy (i.e., court staff, members of 
the California Bar, county employees) 
7  
No distinct circulation exists (public, staff, 
judges, and inmates mingle) 7 7 
Partial weapons screening only (i.e., 
screening part time or only with hand wands) 7  
No secure holding facilities exist 7  
No access control system is in place (i.e., 
there is no key control system or card access 
system) 
6  
Sally port (for inmate delivery) is unsecured 6  
No duress annunciation system is in place 6  
Some exemptions exist to the entrance 
screening policy (i.e., court staff, off duty law 
enforcement) 
5 5 
No secure parking exists for judges and court 
staff 5 5 
No barrier/partition exists between clerks and 
public 5  
Exterior lighting is greatly lacking or 
nonexistent 5  
Landscaping near facility is overgrown and 
affords opportunity to hide improvised 
explosive devices 
5  
A duress annunciation system exists, but 
reliability is uncertain and/or system is not in 
place in some vulnerable areas 
5  
No ballistic resistant material exists in 
vulnerable windows or wall paneling 4  
No intrusion alarm system exists 4  
No CCTV system exists 4  
Partially controlled parking areas exist for 
judges and court staff (i.e., drop arm barrier) 4  
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Some access controls are in place, but 
application is not comprehensive 4 4 
Some, but not all, of the vulnerable windows 
and wall paneling features ballistic resistant 
material 
4 4 
Semi-distinct circulation exists (ex. some 
minimal mixing of staff and inmates may 
occur) 
4  
A CCTV system is in place which is 
intermittently monitored and/or not 
comprehensive throughout the courthouse 
4  
Landscaping is partially trimmed but some 
problem areas exist where improvised 
explosive devices could be hidden 
3 3 
The sally port is moderately, but not fully, 
secured 3  
Partial clerk’s security windows exist 3 3 
Exterior lighting partially, but not fully, 
illuminates exterior of courthouse during 

























Court D: Consequences 
 
Direct Economic Value* Points Direct Economic Value Points 
Below $1M 1 $40M - $50M 6 
$1M - $10M 2 $50M - $60M 7 
$10M - $20M 3 $60M - $70M 8 
$20M - $30M 4 $70M - $80M 9 







Total Risk Assessment: Court D 
 






Square footage of court space Direct Economic Value of Court Facility (square footage x $250) Points 
35,000 $9M 2 
Normalized Consequences Rating .67 
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